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Multinational labor demand responds to wage differentials at the extensive margin, when a 
multinational enterprise (MNE) expands into foreign locations, and at the intensive margin, 
when an MNE operates existing affiliates across locations. We derive conditions for 
parametric and nonparametric identification of an MNE model to infer elasticities of labor 
substitution at both margins, controlling for location selectivity. Prior studies have rarely 
found foreign wages or operations to affect employment. Our strategy detects salient 
adjustments at the extensive margin for German MNEs. With every percentage increase in 
German wages, German MNEs allocate 2,000 manufacturing jobs to Eastern Europe at the 
extensive margin and 4,000 jobs overall. 
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Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are important mediators of world trade. Sur-
prisingly, however, the operation of MNEs has rarely been found to a®ect factor
demands across locations (e.g. Slaughter (2000) for U.S., Konings (2004) for Eu-
ropean MNEs). We quantify the e®ect of permanent wage di®erentials on MNE
employment at two critical margins. An MNE's labor demand responds to inter-
national wage di®erentials at the extensive margin, when the MNE expands into a
foreign market, and at the intensive margin, when the MNE operates existing a±l-
iates and chooses employment. Our paper thus o®ers an integration of two strands
of the empirical literature|one on MNEs' location choices (Devereux and Gri±th
1998, Head and Mayer 2004) and one on MNE operations across existing locations
(Slaughter 2000, Head and Ries 2002, Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter 2005)|into
a uni¯ed estimation framework.
The MNE's two-stage decision, to ¯rst expand (extensive margin) and then op-
erate (intensive margin), has a well-de¯ned econometric counterpart in sample selec-
tion. Aside from the economic interpretation of the extensive margin, labor demand
or cost function estimates at the intensive margin are subject to selectivity bias un-
less corrected. Using comprehensive data on German manufacturing MNEs and their
majority-owned foreign manufacturing a±liates, we ¯nd that an MNE's propensity
to select a foreign location is a salient predictor of its labor demand across locations
and that permanent wage di®erentials have a strong impact on multinational labor
substitution both at the extensive and the intensive margin.
A methodological contribution of our paper is to extend the univariate sample
selection case to one of multiple selections. We derive conditions under which the
common Heckman (1979) selection correction can be applied location by location to
correct outcome estimation, in our case a seemingly unrelated equation system of
the MNE's cost function. We also prove identi¯cation of a nonparametric selection
model, which extends single-equation models (such as those in Das, Newey, and
Vella (2003)) to the multivariate case. The nonparametric estimator is simple to
implement in a two-stage approach and is applicable to the estimation of multivariate
demand systems in general (for a recent parametric approach to multivariate demand
see e.g. Yen (2005)).
To quantify the extensive margin, we base our parametric and non-parametric
estimators of location selection on MNE-wide pro¯t maximization. Existing ¯rm-
level studies on the expansion of MNEs do not ¯nd low wages or low per-capita
incomes to be signi¯cant predictors of location choice (e.g. Devereux and Gri±th
(1998) for U.S., Head and Mayer (2004) for Japanese, Buch, Kleinert, Lipponer,
and Toubal (2005) for German MNEs).1 Multinomial logit estimation turns wages
1Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) ¯nd evidence in aggregate data that relatively abundant
high-skilled labor is a signi¯cant predictor of foreign direct investment (FDI) of U.S. MNEs (and
Blonigen, Davies, and Head (2003) ¯nd that larger skill di®erentials predict less foreign MNE
2into signi¯cant predictors of location choice in Disdier and Mayer (2004) for French
MNEs, and in Becker, Ekholm, JÄ ackle, and Muendler (2005) for Swedish MNEs
and the same German MNEs as in this paper. But multinomial logit estimation
rests on the assumption that independent agents within the MNE decide on distinct
investment projects; that is incompatible with MNE-wide pro¯t maximization. De-
vereux and Gri±th (1998) estimate multinomial logit choice and, to be consistent
with MNE-wide optimization, restrict their sample to MNEs who invest in only one
location abroad; they do not ¯nd wages to be signi¯cant predictors of U.S. MNEs'
location choices. In contrast, when we condition on an MNEs' past presence and its
interaction with wages, we ¯nd wage variables to be statistically signi¯cant predic-
tors of location choices in probit and in non-parametric selection regressions. When
weighted with the impact of location selection on employment, wage di®erentials
across locations are substantial predictors of labor substitution within MNEs at the
extensive margin.
At the intensive margin, the world's ten largest MNEs in 2000 produce almost
one percent of world GDP, and the one hundred largest MNEs are responsible for
more than four percent of world GDP.2 Despite this apparent importance of MNEs
for international transactions, Slaughter (2000) reports that, in a sample of U.S.
MNEs, operations in low-wage locations have no detectable impact on MNE em-
ployment in the home market. In contrast, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) attributed
about a third of U.S. relative wage changes to outsourcing (within MNEs or across
¯rms). Similar to Slaughter (2000), Konings (2004) and Barba Navaretti and Castel-
lani (2004) ¯nd no evidence for the hypothesis that operations of European MNEs
in low-wage locations have an impact on home-market labor demand. Braconier and
Ekholm (2000) and Marin (forthcoming) estimate wage elasticities of labor demand
and intermediate imports from Central and Eastern Europe for Western European
MNEs, and report no signi¯cant e®ect of foreign relative wages. Brainard and Riker
(2001), however, do ¯nd that foreign a±liate employment substitutes modestly for
U.S. parent employment but less so than for employment across foreign locations.3
Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2005) shift focus from factor demands to inter-
mediate input uses and, as an exception to most prior ¯rm-level evidence, report
that a±liates of U.S. MNEs process signi¯cantly more intra-¯rm imports the lower
are low-skilled wages. The result challenges the view that relative abundance in
low-skilled labor fails to attract MNEs. We revisit their result in the context of
multinational labor substitution and extend the estimation framework to incorpo-
rate location choice. When controlling for the propensity to select a foreign location,
wages are statistically signi¯cant and economically salient predictors of MNEs' labor
demands at the intensive margin.
activity).
2UNCTAD press release TAD/INF/PR/47 (12/08/02).
3At the aggregate level, Brainard (1997) does not ¯nd relative abundance of low-skilled labor
to explain MNE sales patterns across locations.
3Our ¯ndings point to large sunk entry and exit costs so that MNE expansions (or
withdrawals) are infrequent but, when undertaken, they have a sizeable impact on
labor demand. We ¯nd cross-wage elasticities at the extensive margin to be strictly
positive. So, home and foreign employment are substitutes within MNEs not only at
the intensive but also at the extensive margin. Elasticities at the extensive margin
are about half the size of elasticities at the intensive margin in locations close to
home. For overseas developing country wages, however, elasticities are signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero only at the extensive margin. Bootstraps reject equality between
the intensive and the total elasticity of substitution for most locations, corroborating
the importance of the extensive margin. Elasticity point estimates at both margins
are robust across di®erent samples and wage data, speci¯cations, and parametric
and nonparametric estimation techniques.
We evaluate the counterfactual question how many jobs MNEs would reallocate
in response to shrinking wage di®erentials. A one-percent drop in German wages
relative to the sample-mean level would reduce MNE employment in Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE) by around 4,000 jobs, for instance. Similarly, a one-percent
increase in CEE wages would bring 730 jobs to Germany. These are sizeable ¯gures.
Wages in CEE are, on average, about 10 percent of the German level in 2000. If
the estimated elasticities of substitution were constant at all levels of wages, an
increase in CEE wages of 450% to cut the wage gap to Germany in half would
bring 330,000 (= 730 ¢ 450) counterfactual manufacturing jobs to Germany|about
a quarter of the estimated home employment at German manufacturing MNEs.4 Of
course, elasticities of substitution are not constant at all levels of wages so that the
counterfactual prediction is crude. We nevertheless view the magnitude as indicative
of the potential importance of multinational labor substitution.
This paper has ¯ve more sections. Section 2 elaborates a model of the expansion
and operation of MNEs, and Section 3 derives identi¯cation conditions for its estima-
tion under location selectivity. Section 4 presents the data and discusses descriptive
statistics on location choice. Estimation results on multinational labor substitution
are presented in Section 5, and interpreted in counterfactual evaluations. Section 6
concludes.
2 Multinational Expansion and Operation
Let observed employment y`









4If international wage gaps shrink at a similar rate as per capita GDP converges to steady state
and Germany is close to its steady state, the CEE-German wage gap would take around 35 years
to contract to half its present size (Barro and Sala i Martin 1992).
4if MNE j is present at `. Else, y`
jt = 0. In the translog case, the vector x`
jt
of employment predictors includes additively separable transformations of outputs,
inputs and factor prices (we discuss regressor construction below), including the
prevailing wage di®erentials between locations at time t. ²`
jt is a disturbance term.























where the vector djt of presence indicators dk
jt re°ects MNE j's observed pattern of
locations k = 1;:::;L at time t (dk
jt = 1 if ¯rm j is present in location k and dk
jt = 0
otherwise) and contains d`
jt = 1. The information set zj;t¡¿ at moment t ¡ ¿ a®ects
labor demand through the resulting choice of presence in location `.
We de¯ne the extensive margin of labor demand to be the expected labor demand
¹ yext
` in location `, predicted by a ¯rm j's current choices of presence around the world
















where the optimal binary choices (d1
jt;:::;d`
jt;:::;dL
jt) are functions of MNE j's
information set at the moment of location choice t¡¿, and ¿ is the time it takes an
MNE to implement location choices (two to four years, say). The information set
zj;t¡¿ at moment t¡¿ predicts presence in location k with dk
jt = 1(H(zj;t¡¿)+´k
j;t¡¿ >
0), where H(¢) is an unknown function and ´k
j;t¡¿ is a disturbance to the MNE's
presence. Most important, zj;t¡¿ includes the then prevailing wage di®erentials
between locations.
Labor demand at the intensive margin is accordingly de¯ned as
¹ y
int;`
jt ´ ¹ y
`






The labor demand e®ect at the extensive margin ¹ y
ext;`
jt = E[²`
jt jdjt] is an addi-
tive component of conditional labor demand E[y`
jt jx`
jt;djt;zj;t¡¿]. Economically, an
MNE's mere presence at a location typically raises the labor demand prediction
for that location.5 Statistically, the extensive margin needs to be included in the
regression to correct for selectivity.
MNE j produces a vector of location-speci¯c outputs qjt = (q1
jt;:::;qL
jt)0 at L
locations. We consider MNEs to be price takers in input market, whereas they
may have market power in output markets. (We estimate a cost function, so any
pricing behavior in the sales market is consistent with our approach.) On the input
side, we focus on employment. We view MNEs as wage takers in the local markets,
competing with labor demand from non-tradeable goods sectors and incumbent
5To be precise, this is true if high home wages raise the probability of presence at a foreign
location ` and the presence likelihood is positively correlated with labor demand at that foreign
location `. Both conditions are satis¯ed in our MNE sample.
5¯rms. Similarly, we consider demand for capital goods and intermediate inputs
from non-MNEs as su±ciently large so that the remaining demand of MNEs for
those goods has a negligible price impact.
Final goods prices are world-market prices that di®erentiated products from loca-
tions ` = 1;:::;L can fetch, given product characteristics. Final goods are produced
with labor and capital. After controlling for location choice in the formation of the
MNE, we consider installed capital kjt = (k1
jt;:::;kL
jt)0 to be a quasi-¯xed factor in
an MNE's short-run cost function Cjt (but put to use at locations k = 1;:::;L to
di®erent degrees). We consider labor at locations k = 1;:::;L to be immobile across
national borders and its factor prices wt = (w1
t;:::;wL
t )0 as speci¯c to L locations.
2.1 Location choice
De¯ne °`
N as the ¯xed FDI entry costs at location ` and °`
X as the ¯xed FDI exit
costs from location `.6 Then, ¯xed costs of changing presence at location ` in t,




















jt is the indicator for MNE j's current FDI presence at location `, and d`
j;t¡¿
for its past presence. We restrict the long-term ¯xed cost components °`
N and °`
X
to be time invariant in our four-year MNE panel data (but control for time-varying
country and MNE characteristics in selection estimation). The decision-relevant
¯xed cost di®erence F `
j;t¡¿ ´ G`(1;d`
j;t¡¿)¡G`(0;d`
j;t¡¿) between presence at location














N) is sometimes called the hysteresis band and re°ects the sunk cost
e®ect that induces ¯rms to continue operations at location ` (Dixit 1989).7
To select locations (¿ years prior to production and sales), MNE j maximizes
expected pro¯ts Ej;t¡¿[p(qi6=j;t;qjt)0 ¢ qjt ¡ Cjt(qjt;kjt;w)]. This implies that MNE









































6For simplicity, the ¯xed costs of reentry into a given location after a period of absence are
assumed to be equal to the costs at ¯rst entry °`
N.
7Probit estimation with ¯rm-¯xed e®ects is known for problematic performance in panel data
with a short time horizon (Heckman 1981). We therefore do not attempt to estimate MNE-speci¯c
sunk costs of presence F`
j;t¡¿ at location `. We distinguish between entry and exit sunk cost
components to account for MNE-speci¯c di®erences in F`
j;t¡¿, similar to Roberts and Tybout's
(1997) model of sunk costs in exporting status.
6(see Appendix A for a derivation). The unknown function h(z0
j;t¡¿) captures both
expected revenues from producing the pro¯t-maximizing quantity q
`;¤
jt at location `
and expected cost savings from producing at ` (see ¯rst line). Sunk costs of presence
at location ` have an observable component F `
j;t¡¿ by (4) and a disturbance ´`
j;t¡¿.
The disturbance ´`
j;t¡¿ is known to the MNE but not to the researcher. To simplify





j;t¡¿ and include past
presence in any location in the information set zj;t¡¿.
Equation (5) is the selection equation: the empirical rule of presence in locations
` = 1;:::;L. We estimate the rule both parametrically (with a probit regression
and H(zj;t¡¿) = zj;t¡¿°`) and nonparametrically.
2.2 Multiproduct cost function
To obtain theoretically well-de¯ned estimates of elasticities of labor substitution
across locations, we opt for a °exible parametric speci¯cation of the MNE's multi-
product cost function. We ¯rst augment the cost function with parametric correc-
tions for location selectivity. We then proceed to a model with a parametric cost
function part and a nonparametric correction for selectivity.
We use a short-run multiproduct translog cost function to estimate labor de-
mand, and extend it to control for location selectivity.8 A short-run cost function,
given MNE j's location choice, treats MNE j's vector of capital stocks kjt as quasi-
¯xed factors. We prefer a short-run over a long-run cost function because we already
control for the installation of foreign a±liates through location selectivity (5) and
because the inclusion of capital stock variables captures otherwise unobservable
(¯rm-speci¯c) user costs of capital across locations.
Applying Shepard's (1953) lemma to the short-run multiproduct translog cost
function yields location-speci¯c wage bill shares s`
jt ´ w`
ty`
jt=Cjt (the wage bill at
location ` in the MNE's total wage bill) as functions of (qjt;kjt;w). We multiply the
wage bill shares s`
jt with observation-speci¯c scalars Cjt=w`
t to arrive at our outcome












































8We follow Brown and Christensen's (1981, eq. 10.21) short-run version of Christensen, Jorgen-
son, and Lau (1973) and extend the framework to multiple products. A main alternative would be
Hall's (1973) generalization of Diewert's (1971) Leontief cost function to the multiproduct case. We
favor the translog cost function because its dimensionality requirements are considerably leaner
and permit higher-order approximations to the nonparametric correction for selectivity. Kohli
(1978) took the translog speci¯cation to the empirical trade literature.
7(see Appendix B), where ²`
jt is a disturbance.
Compared to translog regression equations in wage bill shares s`
jt, the transfor-
mation with observation-speci¯c scalars Cjt=w`
t to an equivalent regression of y`
jt on
x`
jt has three important advantages. First, there is no constant term among the
regressors x`
jt so that lacking identi¯cation of the constant in a nonparametric se-
lection correction is no concern. Second, wages are regressors only and do not enter
the dependent variable. Third, labor demand is not bounded above so that, condi-
tional on x`
jt, the labor demand disturbance satis¯es the assumption of a one-sided
truncation for (parametric and nonparametric) selectivity correction.
Stacking locations with zero output and factor use. Most MNEs produce in
some but not in all locations. For cases of zero output or input, however, equation (6)
is not well de¯ned. Especially zero turnover and zero capital stocks require attention
because they are MNE-speci¯c, but absence from a location also suggests dropping
wage regressors when no employment occurs.
One possible treatment is estimation of separate equation systems for every single
presence pattern in the data. The resulting estimators are hard to interpret, however,
and plagued by dimensionality: potential presence in up to L ¡ 1 locations outside
the home location implies that there are up to 2L¡1 ¡ 1 regional presence patterns
for an MNE.9 In the German sample in 2000, for instance, only 57 out of 1,770
MNEs are omnipresent in all four world locations while every single one of the 15
possible regional presence pattern occurs. So, there would be 15 sets of estimates.
We choose to stack observations of all MNEs in the sample. Stacking observations
improves e±ciency, collapses the up to 2L¡1¡1 sets of estimates into one consistently
estimated (L¡1)-equation system, and provides a single L £ L matrix of estimates
for wage elasticities of regional labor demands. Stacking is permissible under three
conditions: (i) all MNEs face identical sunk cost F `
j;t¡¿ for presence at location
` conditional on their prior presence and information set (so that presence is not
correlated with inputs); (ii) MNEs face an identical short-run cost function Cjt(¢) =
C(¢) in all locations of presence, conditional on their characteristics (so that one
common parameter vector is justi¯ed); and (iii) the disturbances ²`
jt are uncorrelated
across observations.
We set all missing location variables for an absent MNE j to zero|that is log
employment, turnover, capital stock and wages are zero at location m from where
MNE j is absent. This is equivalent to interacting the translog cost function coef-
¯cients with presence indicators: ¹`m = 0 when no output is produced at location
m, and ·`m = ±`m = 0 when MNE j employs no factors at location m. Stacking
can induce correlations between the transformed regressors and the error ²`
jt in (6).
9MNEs are present in their home location by sample de¯nition, so only 2L¡1 patterns are
observable in principle. Firms that only operate domestically without any foreign a±liate are not
MNEs by de¯nition so that the single presence pattern with the only presence at the home location
must be subtracted.
8To remove this source of potential bias, we include the set of absence indicators
(1¡djt) (with nuisance parameters ¯`




jt ¯` + (1¡djt)¯`
d. The set of absence indicators (1¡djt) also
o®sets the zero output prediction at the sample mean.
3 Estimation under Location Selectivity





































j;t¡¿ are uncorrelated across observations (of MNEs i
and j, and between periods t and t+1). The timing of ´`
j;t¡¿ is not important and
the ´`
j;t¡¿ realization could be simultaneous with ²`
jt. Natural exclusion restrictions
on covariates that do not enter the cost function identify location selection.
In this section, we discuss cross-regional distributional assumptions on (²`
jt;´`
j;t¡¿)
and permissible estimation techniques under those conditions. For a parametric
cost function speci¯cation (with well-de¯ned elasticities of substitution), a para-
metric approach to selectivity appears natural to start with. We present sets of
necessary and su±cient distributional assumptions for univariate Heckman (1979)
corrections location by location, to which we refer as parametric selectivity correc-
tion. Empirical evidence on the necessary assumptions is favorable in our sample.
For multivariate selectivity, an extension of the Heckman (1979) estimator has a
complicated form (conditional moments of multivariate normal distributions have
no known closed form for multiple truncations, see Kotz, Balakrishnan, and Johnson
(2000)). Simulated maximum-likelihood would be a viable technique but requires
joint multivariate normality.
To be free of distributional restrictions, we extend the parametric approach to
a nonparametric multivariate selection model (similar to one in Das, Newey, and
Vella (2003)) and account for cross-location correlations between labor demand
choices at the extensive and intensive margins. We derive identi¯cation from com-
mon su±cient assumptions. The nonparametric procedure allows for unknown dis-








3.1 Parametric selectivity correction
Consider Heckman (1979) selectivity corrections location by location. There are
two alternative sets of assumptions that allow for such a parametric correction,
9whereby labor demand (6) in ` only requires correction for selectivity (5) into ` but












Assumption 1 The disturbances (²k
jt;´`
j;t¡¿) are multivariate normally distributed
and independent of xm
jt and zj;t¡¿ for all k;`;m (and Var(´`
j;t¡¿) = 1). In addition,
either
(a) the part of the selection shock that correlates with labor demand shocks is an
MNE-speci¯c disturbance and does not vary by location so that, conditional on
the MNE-speci¯c shocks, ²k
jt and ²`
jt as well as ´k
j;t¡¿ and ´`
j;t¡¿ are independent
for k 6= `, or
(b) the labor-demand related part of the selection shock varies by location but is
independent of labor demand shocks in other locations (²k
jt and ´`
j;t¡¿ are inde-
pendent for k 6= `),
for `;k = 1;:::;L.
Especially case (a), where the part of the selection shock ´`
j;t¡¿ that correlates
with labor demand shocks ²k
jt is an MNE-speci¯c disturbance and does not vary
by location, is plausible in economic terms. Suppose selection disturbances include
both host country-speci¯c parts such as, for example, surprising changes to pro¯t
repatriation policies and include MNE-speci¯c parts such as shocks to its sunk entry
costs. Changes to host country repatriation policies a®ect the entry decision. But
once the MNE operates in the host country, it minimizes costs irrespective of entry-
relevant host-country shocks so that cost function disturbances are unrelated to the
entry-relevant policy shocks. In case (a), all relevant information for labor demand
at any location ` is fully contained in the single indicator d`
jt (which is as informative
about ´`
j;t¡¿ as any other location indicator). Case (b) is more restrictive and implies
that neither MNE-speci¯c nor host-country speci¯c shocks to presence at location `
have a bearing on labor demand at other locations k 6= `.
Note that cross-location correlations of labor demand shocks are not necessarily
evidence against Assumption 1. As the proof to Proposition 1 will show, case (a) of
MNE-speci¯c selection shocks induces a correlation between labor demand shocks
across locations: ²k
jt and ´`








j;t¡¿) if and only if Assumption 1 holds.
Proof. Because any normally distributed variable can be linearly decomposed into


























10for independent standard normal variables ek
jt;uk
jt;vk
jt (k = 1;:::;L), where ! 2 [0;1]
is a weight to satisfy (¾`
´)2 = ¾``
´ = 1, and ¼k`
´ , ¼k`
² , ¸k` are parameters. To prove
su±ciency, let ¼k`
´ = ¼k`
² = 0 for k 6= `.
First consider (a) MNE-speci¯c selection shocks ´`
j;t¡¿ whose labor demand re-
lated part does not vary over locations. Concretely, set ek
jt = ejt for all locations k,
and denote ¸¢` ´
P
k ¸k`. Then the variances and covariances of the selection shocks
(7) are ¾``
´ = 1 and ¾k`
´ = 1¡!. The variances and covariances of the labor demand
shocks (8) are ¾``
² = (¸¢`)2 + (¼``
² )2 and ¾k`
² = (¸¢`)2. And the covariances between
the selection shock in location k and the demand shock in location ` are ¾k`
´² = ¸¢`.
Second, consider (b) location-varying selection shocks ´`
j;t¡¿ that are independent
of labor demand shocks in other locations. Concretely, set ¸k` = 0 for k 6= `,
and denote ¸¢` ´ ¸`` for comparability. Then the selection shock variances and
covariances are ¾``
´ = 1 and ¾k`
´ = 0. The variances and covariances of the labor
demand shocks are ¾``
² = (¸¢`)2 + (¼``
² )2 and ¾k`
² = 0. The covariances between the





´² = 0 for k 6= `.



































², and Á(¢) and
©(¢) are the standard normal density and distribution functions. This is precisely the
likelihood function for independent Heckman (1979) correction location by location.
For necessity, observe that parameters ¼k`
´ 6= 0 or ¼k`
² 6= 0 for any k 6= ` cause
cross-equation correlations and do not permit concentrating out u`
jt and v`
jt to arrive
at (9). Similarly, ¸k` 6= 0 for any k 6= ` precludes concentrating out e`
jt to arrive
at (9).
Estimation. Extending the parametric two-stage procedure to L locations, we
¯rst estimate equations (5) with probit regressions by location. Second, we estimate
outcome (6) at location ` by including the predicted selectivity hazard (inverse of the
Mills ratio) ^ ¤`
jt from the ¯rst stage among the regressors (we also include absence
indicators (1¡djt) among the regressors to prevent stacking bias). The coe±cient
on the predicted selectivity hazard equals ¯`
¤ ´ ½``
²´¾`
². We implement the second-
stage estimation of (6) for L¡1 locations (excluding home) by iterating Zellner's
(1962) seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) over the estimated disturbance covari-
ance matrix until the estimates converge. This is equivalent to maximum-likelihood
estimation (Dhrymes 1971) and makes estimation invariant to the deleted location
equation L (Barten 1969). Through constraints, we impose linear homogeneity in
factor prices and symmetry of wage coe±cients (see appendix B). We treat induced
11heteroskedasticity following Heckman (1979) (resulting in di®ering standard errors
on symmetric coe±cients). After estimation, we test whether either of the two pos-
sible sets of distributional assumptions are satis¯ed. We will ¯nd implications of set
(b) violated but fail to ¯nd evidence against (a).
Tests. Implications of Assumption 1 are testable. In case (a) of MNE-speci¯c
selection shocks and for any ! < 1, Assumption 1 implies that ¾k`
´ is the same for
any pair of locations k 6= `. Note that we have no evidence on ¾k`
´² for k 6= ` from
location-by-location estimation. We obtain estimates of ¾k`
´ from multivariate probit
estimation instead and use a Â2-test for their equality.
Under the additional assumption that ! = 0, there is a further test to query
case (a), whether selection shocks are purely MNE-speci¯c. Probit (maximum
likelihood) estimation of selection in the Heckman procedure does not predict the
disturbances ´jt. A testable implication of an MNE-speci¯c selection shock, how-
ever, is that, if an MNE is neither present in all locations nor absent from all
locations, the choices of presence and absence must be consistent with a location-
independent MNE-speci¯c selection shock for all locations. Concretely, an MNE
observation contradicts the assumption of a location-independent selection shock if
zj;t¡¿°k ¡ F k
j;t¡¿ > zj;t¡¿°` ¡ F `
j;t¡¿ for locations k of absence and locations ` of
presence because ´jt can be subtracted from both sides of the inequalities. This
implication is testable for the predicted values, which are normally distributed con-
ditional on zj;t¡¿ and dj;t¡¿ by normality of ´jt.
For (b) location-variant selection shocks, the set of assumptions implies that
¾k`







jt must have zero coe±-
cients. We test this implication.
Both sets (a) and (b) of assumptions imply that ²k
jt is independent of dk
jt for all k
because ²k
jt and ´`
j;t¡¿ are independent. We include absence indicators (1¡djt) among
the regressors in the outcome equation, however, so this is not a useful implication
in our context.
3.2 Nonparametric selectivity correction



































no distributional assumptions are placed on ´`
j;t¡¿ or ²jt and H(¢) is an unknown
function.
We augment the nonparametric sample selection model in Das, Newey, and Vella
(2003) to remain identi¯ed under multivariate binary selection (similar in spirit to a
selection model with endogeneity in Das, Newey, and Vella (2003)). Suppose ´k
j;t¡¿
12and ²`
jt are correlated. Suppose also that zj;t¡¿ and x`
jt are correlated (e.g. wages
in the past and present, as our data show). Because dk




jt is a function of zj;t¡¿, it correlates with x`
jt. So, if the
labor demand equation does not condition on dk
jt, the identifying restriction that x`
jt
and y`
jt are uncorrelated will be violated.
De¯ne the propensity score (the expected probability of selection conditional on
zj;t¡¿) as p`
jt ´ E[d`
jt jzj;t¡¿] = 1¡G(¡H(zj;t¡¿)), where G(¢) is the cumulative
distribution function of ´`
j;t¡¿. Then, assuming G(¢) is one-to-one and changing
variables with u`
jt = 1¡G(´`




















































So, the conditional labor demand disturbance for location ` depends only on the
propensity score for that location and the pattern of presence elsewhere. Observed


































jt ), where hats denote estimates
















jt=1) = 1 implies that ¢»`(x`
jt) is constant,
(iii) rzj;t¡¿p`
jt 6= 0 with probability one,
for ` = 1;:::;L.
Part (i) requires, as in the parametric case, that the conditional expectation of
the labor demand disturbance at location ` is only a function of the propensity score







jt¯` is a separate additive component.
This speci¯cation extends nonparametric selectivity correction in Das, Newey, and
Vella (2003) to the multivariate case.
13Part (ii) is the same identi¯cation condition as in Das, Newey, and Vella (2003)
and implies that p`
jt (which enters m`(p`
jt;d
k6=`
jt )) depends on variables in zj;t¡¿
that are not in x`







jt ) and ¢m`(p`
jt;d
k6=`
jt ) = ¡m`(p`
jt;d
k6=`
jt ) indeterminate|a violation of (ii).
In our context, the exclusion restriction arises naturally because the MNE chooses
x`
jt in response to information after t ¡ ¿, whereas the decision of presence is based
on zj;t¡¿. In addition, parent-¯rm characteristics and competitor-level host-country
characteristics are predictors of presence but not related to the labor-cost speci¯c
part of the cost function other than through wages themselves. The rank condi-
tion (iii) requires that the information set zj;t¡¿ predicts the propensity score.
Assumption 2 allows us to relax the earlier identifying assumption that (²k
jt;´`
j;t¡¿)
is independent of xm
jt and zj;t¡¿ for all k;`;m. Assumption 2 only requires that, con-
ditional on the propensity score p`
jt, ²`
jt is uncorrelated with all functions of x`
jt
and zj;t¡¿. Moreover, the nonparametric estimator xm
jt allows for conditional het-
eroskedasticity of unknown form (and thus presents a nonparametric alternative
to Chen and Khan's (2003) three-step estimator). Also note that we need no as-
sumption on the cross-equation correlation of ´`
j;t¡¿ if we include d
k6=`
jt . This makes
nonparametric analysis a powerful tool for multivariate binary selection estimation.
Proposition 2 If Assumption 2 holds and if m`(p`
jt;d
k6=`
jt ) and p`
jt(zj;t¡¿) are contin-





jt ) are identi¯ed up to additive constants.




jt^ ¯` + ^ m`(p`
jt;d
k6=`









jt ) = 0.
This identity must be di®erentiable with respect to x`





















The ¯rst equation implies that ¢»`(x`
jt) = x`
jt(^ ¯` ¡ ¯`) = c1 for a constant c1
and x`
jt¯` is identi¯ed up to this constant. By rzj;t¡¿p`




jt ) = ^ m`(p`
jt;d
k6=`
jt ) ¡ m`(p`
jt;d
k6=`




jt ) is identi¯ed up to that constant.
Note that lacking identi¯cation of additive constants is not a problem in our
context. The transformed cost function regressors x`
jt¯` in equation (6) do not
include a constant term. To assess the labor demand e®ect of permanent wage






scalar), for which the constant does not matter.
14Conversely, if we want to include the propensity scores p
k6=`
jt in the second-stage
regression, instead of the presence indicators d
k6=`
jt , we can only do so if ´`
j;t¡¿ and
²k
jt are uncorrelated across locations (k 6= `). This is a drawback of identi¯cation
under Assumption 2.









jt = 1; zj;t¡¿
¤
;
which does not condition on the observed location pattern outside `. This de¯ni-
tion allows us to investigate the impact of a permanent wage di®erential (in zj;t¡¿)
through its e®ect on the entire grid of an MNE's potential locations. Formally,
we can now evaluate rpjtm`(pjt) ¢ rzj;t¡¿pjt (a matrix), where pjt is the vector
of propensity scores. Under the restriction that ´`
j;t¡¿ and ²k
jt are not correlated
across locations (k 6= `), dk
jt is not correlated with ²k
jt because ²`
jt must be uncorre-
lated with all functions of zj;t¡¿. Then we can relax item (i) in Assumption 2 to
E[²`
jt jd`




jt = 1;zj;t¡¿] = m`(pjt) and Cov(²`
jt;´k






jt=1) = 1 implies that ¢»`(x`
jt) is constant,
(iii) rzj;t¡¿p`
jt 6= 0 with probability one,
for ` = 1;:::;L.





jt with the vector rpjt¢m`(pjt), and rzj;t¡¿p`
jt with rzj;t¡¿pjt).
Proposition 3 If Assumption 3 holds and if m`(pjt) and p`
jt(zj;t¡¿) are continu-
ously di®erentiable and have continuous distribution functions almost everywhere,
then x`
jt¯` and m`(pjt) are identi¯ed up to additive constants.
Das, Newey, and Vella (2003) establish convergence rates and asymptotic nor-
mality of similar estimators on the basis of smoothness properties of p`
jt(zj;t¡¿) and
m`(pjt) (and a generalization of x`
jt¯` to a function of x`
jt) for splines and power
series. We use power series to approximate p`
jt(zj;t¡¿) and m`(pjt). Power series
are root-n asymptotic normal and can estimate smooth functionals of unknown pa-
rameters (Newey 1997). Most important for our application, the ¯rst derivative of
the power series estimator is a smooth functional and hence also root-n asymptotic
normal.
15Estimation. We ¯rst estimate equations (5) with individual linear regressions by
location. We use a third-order polynomial in wages and two additional predictors,
alongside otherwise linear predictors (to break the curse of dimensionality). Second,
we include the predicted propensity scores ^ p`
jt from the ¯rst stage on the second
stage (6). Under Assumption 2 we approximate m`(p`
jt;d
k6=`
jt ) with a third-order
polynomial in p`
jt, interacted with d
k6=`
jt (we continue to include absence indicators
(1¡djt) without interactions to both approximate m`(¢) and remove potential stack-
ing bias). Under Assumption 3 we approximate m`(p`
jt) with a third-order polyno-
mial in pjt (and include absence indicators (1¡djt) among the regressors to remove
potential stacking bias). We implement the second-stage estimation of (6) for L¡1
locations (excluding home) by iterating SUR over the estimated disturbance covari-
ance matrix until the estimates converge. Through constraints, we impose linear
homogeneity in factor prices and symmetry of wage coe±cients (see appendix B).
3.3 Wage Elasticities of Labor Demand
We use elasticities of substitution to quantify the responses of multinational labor
demand y`
jt to permanent wage changes. The (constant-output) cross-price elastic-







s` (k 6= `) and "
T
`` =
Ã`` + s`(s` ¡ 1)
s` (10)
for a short-run translog cost function function, where s` = w`y`=C is the wage bill
share of the workforce at ` (the wage bill at location ` in the MNE's total wage
bill) and Ã`k ´ @s`
jt=@ lnwk is the marginal change of the wage bill share at ` in
response to a log wage change at k. These elasticities can be calculated both for
each individual MNE-j observation and in the aggregate using sample means. We
will report elasticity estimates from cost function coe±cients and observed mean
wage bill shares.
A permanent change of the wage level wk in location k is re°ected in both vectors
of regressors x`
jt (with wk
t) and zj;t¡¿ (with wk
t¡¿). So, the response of the wage bill
share s`
jt to a permanent change in lnwk
t is



















t. The second term in (11) is a measure of the labor demand response




By (6), the labor demand response at the intensive margin is Ãint
`k = ±`k under
any of the Assumptions 1 through 3. The labor demand response at the extensive



























We multiply by present wages wk
t because estimation on the ¯rst stage uses wk
t as
regressors, not their logs. We divide by Cjt=w`
t to convert estimates from labor
demand equation (6) back into their wage bill share equivalents because we also
use Ãint
`k = ±`k at the intensive margin. Under Heckman (1979) correction (Assump-
tion 1), °`




coe±cient on the selectivity hazard in the outcome equation, and ¢`
jt is the ¯rst
derivative of the selectivity hazard ¤`
jt (the inverse of the Mills ratio) with respect
to its scalar argument, ¢`
j(zj;t¡¿°`) ´ ¤`
j(zj;t¡¿°`)[¤`
j(zj;t¡¿°`) ¡ zj;t¡¿°`]. Because
¢`
j(¢) 2 (0;1), the sign of the log wage e®ect on the wage bill at the extensive margin
is the sign of the product °`
wk¯`
¤ (the coe±cients on the two stages of estimation).
Under polynomial series estimation, the derivatives of m`(¢) and p`
jt are the marginal
e®ects on the third-order polynomials, evaluated at the sample mean.10
We run 200 bootstraps on the two-stage procedure to ¯nd standard errors for
our elasticity estimates. Bootstrapping is advantageous because it does not require
treatment of insigni¯cant wage coe±cients from the ¯rst-sage regressions in our
quanti¯cation of the extensive margin. Moreover, Eakin, McMillen, and Buono
(1990) show in simulations that analytic con¯dence intervals for elasticity estimates
under normality assumptions can widely di®er from bootstrapped con¯dence interval
estimates.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our main data source is a con¯dential three-dimensional panel (parent-af¯liate-year
observations) of German MNEs at Deutsche Bundesbank (BuBa). We retain man-
ufacturing parents and majority-owned manufacturing a±liates only. We transform
the data to parent-location-year observations and combine the data with comple-
mentary information on wages and host-country characteristics from various sources.
Firm-level data. Information on foreign a±liates' turnover, employment and
¯xed assets stems from BuBa's midi database (MIcro database Direct Investment,
formerly direk). midi contains outward FDI information from a legally mandated
10If w`
t is a strictly location-speci¯c variable, equation (12) does not apply to k = ` since w`
t drops
from a binary probit likelihood function. By our variable construction, w`
t is MNE j's competitors'
mean factor price exposure. It is thus also MNE-speci¯c.
17Table 1: Employment at German MNEs in 2000
HOM CEE DEV OIN WEU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Employment 1,423,086a 245,721 332,622 319,221 394,579
Estimation sample employment 962,726 125,199 184,560 139,240 191,854
Mean employment per sample MNE 1,629.0 387.6 407.4 736.7 282.6
Sources: midi and ustan 1996 to 2001, manufacturing MNEs and their majority-owned foreign
manufacturing a±liates. Locations: HOM (Germany), CEE (Central and Eastern Europe), DEV
(Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU (Western Europe).
aPredicted German employment at in- and out-of-sample MNEs, based on linear employment
regressions to account for incomplete midi-ustan matches.
annual survey, which covers the universe of German ¯rms and households with for-
eign corporate holdings above minimum ownership shares and capital stock thresh-
olds (Lipponer 2003). Individually identi¯ed outward FDI data are available for the
years 1996-2001 and provide two-digit NACE 1.1 sector classi¯cations for the parent
and a±liates. We restrict our sample to majority-owned foreign a±liates because
estimation of a multilocation cost function suggests the use of observations of parent
¯rms with full managerial control and because majority ownership is insensitive to
a change in the noti¯cation threshold in midi 1999. Assets and capital structure of
every majority-owned foreign ¯rm are reported in midi, including in years with zero
turnover. Turnover does not distinguish within-MNE shipments from ¯nal sales but
is nevertheless a proxy to a±liate production for cost function estimation.
Balance sheet and income statement information for German parent ¯rms comes
from BuBa's ustan database, which records this information for German ¯rms that
draw a bill of exchange (for a documentation in English see Deutsche Bundesbank
(1998)). The bill of exchange is a common form of payment among ¯rms of all sizes
throughout the sample period 1996-2001 (though losing some popularity thereafter),
and ustan is considered the most comprehensive source of balance sheet data for
companies of all sizes outside the ¯nancial sector in Germany. The midi and ustan
data were linked by parent name and address in previous work (Becker, Ekholm,
JÄ ackle, and Muendler 2005), resulting in the loss of some observations from the
universe.11
To obtain interpretable results, we lump host countries into four aggregate lo-
cations: CEE (Central and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN
(Overseas Industrialized countries), and WEU (Western Europe); see table 15 in
the Appendix for de¯nitions. As Table 1 shows, the four aggregate foreign locations
11Our conservative string matching routine ¯ltered out potential duplicates from time-varying
¯rm identi¯ers in ustan. In manual treatments, only doubtlessly identi¯able parent pairs from
midi and ustan were kept. At the expense of reduced sample size, this caution guarantees the
formation of time-consistent parent pairs.
18Table 2: Location Counts by MNE
L in 2000 Total
L in 1996 1 2 3 4 5 (100%)
1 0.0% 83.5% 12.2% 2.6% 1.6% 794
2 83.7% 12.5% 3.2% 0.6% 687
34.7% 54.7% 8.2% 2.1% 0.4% 1,052
3 23.7% 55.8% 15.8% 4.7% 190
28.0% 17.1% 40.2% 11.4% 3.4% 264
4 11.1% 25.0% 45.8% 18.1% 72
24.2% 8.4% 19.0% 34.7% 13.7% 95
5 7.4% 3.7% 22.2% 66.7% 27
35.7% 4.8% 2.4% 14.3% 42.9% 42
Total 630 211 91 44 976
477 1,293 308 112 57 2,247
Source: midi population 1996 and 2000 (not matched to ustan), manufacturing MNEs and their
majority-owned foreign manufacturing a±liates. Locations: Home (Germany), CEE (Central and
Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU
(Western Europe); see table 15 for de¯nitions.
host similarly large manufacturing workforces for German manufacturing MNEs:
between 250,000 and 400,000 employees. Aggregation into four foreign locations
beyond home reduces the estimated cross-wage labor demand elasticity matrix to
¯ve columns and rows (with 25 elasticity estimates). Except for possibly DEV,
which spans Latin America and the Asia-Paci¯c region (except Japan, Australia
and New Zealand), aggregate locations are fairly homogeneous. Among the low-
wage locations we focus on CEE, where most expansions happen. Among the 2,247
midi MNEs with foreign presence either in 1996 or 2000, CEE was the region where
MNEs opened most new a±liates, 18.2 percent more in 2000 than in 1996, followed
by DEV with 12.6 percent, OIN with 3.2 percent and WEU with 2.0 percent.
midi and ustan matches are incomplete so that we do not observe parent em-
ployment for every German MNE. For comparisons, we predict total parent employ-
ment for the full sample of German manufacturing MNEs from a linear regression of
parent employment on foreign employments and estimate that German manufactur-
ing MNEs with majority-owned foreign manufacturing a±liates employ about 1.4
million German workers. Conditional on MNE presence, the largest employment
per sample MNE occurs in OIN and the smallest employment in WEU.
Table 2 shows changes to the presence patterns of German MNEs between 1996
and 2000. Adjustments are infrequent. Among ¯rms who remain MNEs in both
19Table 3: MNE Counts of Changing Affiliate Numbers
CEE DEV OIN WEU MNE Total
N2000 ¡ N1996 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
· ¡3 2 3 2 15 22
¡2 3 11 3 14 31
¡1 6 17 11 64 98
0 186 131 145 397 859
+1 25 32 20 72 149
+2 11 11 4 16 42
+3 2 6 4 10 22
¸ +4 7 11 4 14 36
MNE Total 242 222 193 602 1,259
¹ N2000 1.49 2.38 1.56 1.96
¹ N1996 1.41 2.28 1.50 2.01
Sources: midi population 1996 and 2000 (not matched to ustan). MNEs with regional presence of
at least one a±liate in 1996; manufacturing MNEs and their majority-owned foreign manufacturing
a±liates. Locations: Home (Germany), CEE (Central and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing
countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU (Western Europe). Median number of
a±liates by MNE, location and year: 1.
years, more than four in ¯ve with a presence in only one location abroad in 1996
keep exactly one foreign location (large numbers in row 2; large numbers sum to 100
percent for location counts 2 through 5). More than half of all MNEs who are present
in only one foreign location in 1996 have a presence in only one foreign location in
2000 (small numbers in row 2; small numbers sum to 100 percent for location counts
1 through 5). In general, entries along the diagonal exhibit the highest frequency
in every row and every column. Regional expansions are gradual: the frequencies
above the diagonal decrease monotonically in every row. Regional exits, however, are
not gradual: MNEs who exit most frequently abandon all foreign locations at once;
frequencies in the ¯rst column dominate frequencies below the diagonal in every
row (small numbers in column 1). There is a large number of complete withdrawals
between 1996 and 2000 (477 out of 2,247 MNEs). Note that the midi data cover
the universe of German ¯rms with FDI above minimum thresholds, and sample
attrition is mitigated by the legal obligation to report and Deutsche Bundesbank's
commitment to follow up on missing questionnaires.
German MNEs typically pursue a single-a±liate strategy of foreign expansions:
the median number of a±liates of a German MNE per location is one. Table 3 shows
that, once an MNE has established its presence in a given location with at least one
a±liate, the number of a±liates hardly changes: 859 out of 1,259 observations of
20MNEs in given locations exhibit no change to the number of a±liates between 1996
and 2000; 247 out of 1,259 observations of MNEs in their locations increase or
decrease the number of a±liates by one. A small remainder of 153 manufacturing
parents chooses to change the number of a±liates by more. (The MNE total in
Table 3 is smaller than that in Table 2 because we condition on presence in a
location.) Together, the infrequent changes to foreign presence in Tables 2 and 3
suggest that MNEs face potentially large sunk costs of foreign presence.
Changes to the number of host countries within locations are even more infre-
quent than changes to the number of a±liates: an analysis of host country changes
similar to Table 3 shows that 947 out of 1,259 observations of MNEs in given loca-
tions exhibit no change in the number of selected host countries within the location.
Infrequent net changes to the number of a±liates and countries could, in principle,
conceal gross changes such as changes to the country composition within a loca-
tion or exit and reentry with a di®erent a±liate. Yet only small fractions of MNEs
who maintain a constant number of a±liates within a location change countries in
the location. In both CEE and WEU 4.2 percent of MNEs with constant a±liate
numbers between 1996 and 2000 change country, and 7.2 percent of the MNEs with
constant a±liate numbers in DEV change country, but none do so in OIN. Simi-
larly small fractions are associated with changing a±liate IDs, suggesting that the
few gross changes beyond net changes are mostly country changes and not reentries
with di®erent a±liates. Motivated by these ¯ndings, we de¯ne the extensive margin
(selection into a location) as the presence of an MNE in an aggregate location with
at least one a±liate. We do not distinguish the few country changes within aggre-
gate locations for selection estimation, but our labor demand (outcome) estimation
accounts for varying country-level exposures.
We de°ate parent variables with the German CPI and de°ate a±liate variables
with country-level CPIs (from the IMF's International Financial Statistics). CPI
de°ation factors are re-based to unity at year end 1998. We transform foreign
currency values to their EUR equivalents in December 1998 in order to remove
nominal exchange rate °uctuations. December 1998 is the mid point in time for our
1996-2001 sample. Introduction of the euro in early 1999 makes December 1998 a
natural reference date. See Appendix C for details on currency conversion.
Complementary data. Wage information is not reported in midi. We obtain
manufacturing wages by country and sector for 1996 through 2001 from the unido
Industrial Statistics Database at the 3-digit ISIC level (dividing sectoral wage bills
by employment). To mitigate possible workforce composition e®ects in our la-
bor demand regression on wages, we use medians over sectors by foreign country.
Though German wages are available from ustan, we also take the German wages
from unido for comparability; we use sector wages for location selection estimation
(where workforce composition behind labor cost measures is not an econometric
concern) and Germany-wide sector medians for translog estimation. We conduct ro-
21Table 4: Sample Means of Variables
HOM CEE DEV OIN WEU
(t: 1998-2001, t ¡ ¿: 1996-99) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Indic.: Presence in t 1 .379 .323 .299 .702
Indic.: Presence in t ¡ ¿ 1 .351 .296 .281 .706
MNE-wide regressors (Labor demand estimation)
Wage bill share (t) .791 .067 .049 .170 .191
ln Fixed assets (t) 17.264 14.886 15.108 15.804 15.282
ln Turnover (t) 18.450 15.931 16.505 17.277 17.073
ln Wage (t) 10.360 8.286 8.657 10.316 10.098
Competitor-average regressors (Selection estimation)
ln sample-mean Wage (t ¡ ¿) 10.428 8.278 8.708 10.348 10.076
Comp.s' hosts' ln Market access (t ¡ ¿) 11.234 10.525 12.637 12.826 11.552
Comp.s' hosts' skill share < Home (t ¡ ¿) 20.151 18.958 22.358 22.565 20.715
Comp.s' hosts' skill share ¸ Home (t ¡ ¿) 42.100 39.052 48.083 49.629 43.382
Comp.s' hosts' distance (t ¡ ¿) 31.669 29.505 35.930 36.562 32.620
Comp.s' hosts' ln Cons. p.c. (t ¡ ¿) 30.444 28.614 34.007 34.534 31.243
Parent-¯rm regressors (Selection estimation)
Indic.: Headquarters West Germany (t ¡ ¿) .973 .964 .974 .969 .974
ln Count of host countries (t ¡ ¿) 1.138 1.327 1.638 1.478 1.263
ln Employment (t ¡ ¿) 6.342 6.452 7.214 6.880 6.474
ln Equity (t ¡ ¿) 16.662 16.852 17.837 17.588 16.941
ln Liability (t ¡ ¿) 17.728 17.927 18.716 18.373 17.891
ln Capital-labor ratio (t ¡ ¿) 10.835 11.004 11.070 11.104 10.936
Parent observations 1,640 612 457 489 1,095
Sources: midi and ustan 1996 to 2001, censored (second-stage) estimation sample of 1,640 MNEs.
Averages of MNE variables are conditional on presence. Locations: HOM (Germany), CEE (Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries),
WEU (Western Europe).
bustness checks using oww wage data by occupation (Occupational Wages around
the World, Freeman and Oostendorp 2001) between 1983 and 1999 and using ubs
wage data for 1994, 1997, 2000 and 2003. We also obtain sector-speci¯c German
wages from the original data that underly the oww information for Germany. We
de°ate and currency-convert the wages in accordance with all other variables, and
transform them into annual wages. Appendix D provides further details on wage
variable construction.
National accounts information for host-country regressors comes from the World
Bank's World Development Indicators and the IMF's International Financial Statis-
tics. We use cepii bilateral trade and geographic data (www.cepii.fr) to compute
market access to a host country as in Redding and Venables (2004), see Appendix E.
To condition selection estimation on skill endowments beyond labor costs, we in-
22clude the host country's percentage of high-school or higher educated residents in
1999 from Barro and Lee (2001) and interact the variable with an indicator whether
the percentage exceeds that in Germany (19.5%).12
Table 4 shows means of variables by location in the censored panel (of MNEs
with presence in at least one foreign location for labor demand estimation). In
our main speci¯cations, we consider multinational labor demand during the years
1998-2001 (called t) for a sample of 1,640 MNEs and infer their location selection
two years prior to production (t ¡ ¿) from an uncensored sample of 3,392 MNEs.
For robustness checks, we also use a single cross-section of 322 MNEs in 2000 and
their location selection in 1996. The frequency of MNE presence abroad increased
by two to four percentage points between 1996-99 and 1998-2001 in all locations
but WEU (Western European countries) where it slightly fell in the censored panel.
German MNEs spend the bulk of their wage bill (79 percent) at home. From German
MNEs, CEE receives labor expenditures beyond the remaining developing world
combined. (Note that shares do not add to unity across columns because averages are
conditional on presence, omitting absent MNEs). A similar cross-location pattern
arises for turnover and capital stocks.
Substantial wage disparities persist across locations. Between Germany and
CEE, for instance, MNE wages di®er by 2.1 log points, or a factor of around 800
percent (expf10:360 ¡ 8:286g = 8:0 for 1998-2001). This MNE-level di®erence is
smaller, however, than the country-population weighted wage gap of about 1,000
percent (1=:099) in the raw unido wage data in 2000. The smaller conditional
di®erential could re°ect MNE selection into relative high-wage countries within the
low-wage region CEE.
Choice-speci¯c variables (host country attributes) are not identi¯ed in binomial
choice models such as probit for parametric selection correction. We estimate our
model also in an MNE cross-section where we have no time-varying host country
attributes. We therefore transform host country attributes to competitor-averages
by MNE, and use competitor-average transformations in all procedures for compa-
rability. We group MNEs into eight manufacturing sectors13 and calculate mean
host-country attributes over all competitor observations by location and sector. We
take the total of competitors' foreign employments as host-country weights within
the location. The wage at t ¡ ¿ in CEE, for example, is the average wage paid
at competitor's a±liates in CEE. In Table 4, we only take means over MNEs with
presence in a given location so that the table reports CEE wages of the competitors
12For estimation of location selection, we also experimented with German import and export
data from 2000 as controls for trade in the MNE's home sector. The import and export data
were at the two-digit product level (matching NACE 1.1 two-digit sector codes) and by country
of destination or origin (Fachserie 7, Reihe 7 from destatis.de/genesis) but did not prove to be
signi¯cant predictors of location selection.
13The sectors are: food; textiles and leather; wood, pulp and paper; chemicals, rubber, plastic
and energy producing materials; mineral and metal products; machinery and equipment; transport
equipment; manufactures not elsewhere classi¯ed.
23of a German MNE with FDI in CEE.14 German MNEs in CEE, compared to any
other location, face competitors in host countries that o®er the least market access,
that have the smallest skill endowments, that are geographically the closest and that
exhibit the smallest per-capita consumption. The CEE wages paid by competitors
of MNEs in CEE are below those paid by competitors in DEV. MNEs in OIN face
competitors with the strongest host-country market access and host-country skill
endowments.
Parent-level covariates are suggestive of selectivity e®ects at their means. Parents
with headquarters in East Germany (including West Berlin) are slightly more likely
to expand to CEE and OIN than the average German MNE. For all other parent-
¯rm regressors, regional conditional means (columns 2 to 5) exceed the unconditional
mean (column 1), and regional means tend to be the lower the higher the frequency
of MNE presence. Conditional on their presence abroad, MNEs exhibit larger home
workforces, larger parent-¯rm equity or debt, and higher parent-¯rm capital-labor
ratios.
5 Estimation
A permanent wage di®erential between an MNE's home and a foreign location di-
rectly a®ects employment at the intensive margin through labor reallocation across
existing a±liates. A permanent wage di®erential indirectly a®ects labor demand at
the extensive margin by altering the likelihood of presence, which in turn changes
conditional expectations of labor demand. We estimate both margins.
The e®ect of home wages on employment is identi¯able at both margins from
sector variation in a cross-section of German MNEs because individual wage-taking
¯rms face bargained earnings schedules from sectoral agreements between unions and
employers' associations (with one-year to two-year terms).15 Time variation of home
wages provides additional identi¯cation. Similarly, both time variation and variation
across locations identify employment e®ects of foreign wages at the intensive margin.
Identi¯cation of foreign wages at the extensive margin is more limited, however.
Because binomial choice models (of presence or absence) cannot identify coe±cients
of choice-speci¯c variables (host country attributes), foreign wage changes at the
extensive margin are mainly identi¯ed over time. We obtain additional variation by
considering competitor-average foreign wages which vary by MNE. To clear wage
variables of workforce composition e®ects, we use country-wide sector medians for
foreign wages. For German wages, we use sector medians in outcome (translog)
estimation but sector wages in location selection estimation (where composition
14We use the wage level at t¡¿ as a regressor in selection estimation, not its log. For comparisons
to the the log wage at t, we report the log of the sample-mean wage at t ¡ ¿ in Table 4.
15The use of sector home wages and location selectivity controls removes potential ¯rm-level
bargaining e®ects behind labor demand coe±cients on home wages. Foreign a±liates of German
MNEs are few and small, with arguably no impact on foreign wage levels.
24Table 5: Sunk-cost Coefficients in Short Probit Regression
CEE DEV OIN WEU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FDI in CEE (t ¡ ¿) 2.112 -.181 -.131 -.290
(.060)¤¤¤ (.067)¤¤¤ (.071)¤ (.058)¤¤¤
FDI in DEV (t ¡ ¿) -.169 2.200 .124 -.156
(.069)¤¤ (.063)¤¤¤ (.070)¤ (.061)¤¤
FDI in OIN (t ¡ ¿) -.149 .146 2.274 -.140
(.071)¤¤ (.069)¤¤ (.066)¤¤¤ (.063)¤¤
FDI in WEU (t ¡ ¿) -.461 -.220 -.310 1.760
(.056)¤¤¤ (.059)¤¤¤ (.062)¤¤¤ (.051)¤¤¤
Const. -.872 -1.241 -1.319 -.707
(.044)¤¤¤ (.049)¤¤¤ (.050)¤¤¤ (.042)¤¤¤
Obs. 3,392 3,392 3,392 3,392
Sources: midi 1996 to 2001, pooled sample of manufacturing MNEs and their majority-owned
foreign manufacturing a±liates with two-year selection lags (¿ = 2). Standard errors in parenthe-
ses: ¤ signi¯cance at ten, ¤¤ ¯ve, ¤¤¤ one percent. Locations: Home (Germany), CEE (Central
and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU
(Western Europe).
e®ects in wages are not a concern). Estimation at the intensive margin conditions
on a ¯rm's MNE status.
5.1 Location choice
We estimate binomial choices of presence in up to four foreign locations|CEE,
DEV, OIN and WEU|with probit regressions for parametric selectivity correction
(Assumption 1) and with series estimators of selection propensities for nonparamet-
ric correction (Assumptions 2 or 3).
Probit estimation. To have a ¯rst idea of sunk costs in location choice, Table 5
shows probit probability estimates from a short regression of MNE presence on past
presence indicators across locations and a constant. Past presence between 1996 and
1999 at a given location is a highly signi¯cant predictor of MNE presence two years
later in that location (and continues to be highly signi¯cant in a long regression).
MNE presence indicators elsewhere serve as rudimentary controls. We consider this
regression a reduced-form version of the empirical presence rule (5); long regressions
that underpin location selection with additional economic regressions will corrobo-
rate the sunk cost implication that past presence predicts about 70 percent of the
propensity of future presence.
25Table 6: Sunk Entry and Exit Costs in Probability Terms
CEE DEV OIN WEU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sunk entry cost: °N .872¤¤¤ 1.241¤¤¤ 1.319¤¤¤ .707¤¤¤
(.044) (.049) (.050) (.042)
Sunk exit cost: °X 1.240¤¤¤ .959¤¤¤ .954¤¤¤ 1.053¤¤¤
(.291) (.225) (.224) (.247)
Hysteresis band: (°N + °X) 2.112¤¤¤ 2.200¤¤¤ 2.274¤¤¤ 1.760¤¤¤
(.060) (.063) (.066) (.051)
Marginal e®ect of hysteresis band .704¤¤¤ .710¤¤¤ .714¤¤¤ .621¤¤¤
(.015) (.016) (.017) (.014)
Sources: midi 1996 to 2001, 3,392 pooled observations of manufacturing MNEs and their majority-
owned foreign manufacturing a±liates with two-year selection lags. Estimates are probit coe±-
cients from Table 5. Signi¯cance levels from Â2 tests. Standard errors in parentheses: ¤ signi¯cance
at ten, ¤¤ ¯ve, ¤¤¤ one percent. Locations: Home (Germany), CEE (Central and Eastern Europe),
DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU (Western Europe).
The reduced-form estimates provide a summary view of sunk costs in probability













where °N are sunk entry costs, °`
X sunk exit costs, and (°`
X + °`
N) is also called
the hysteresis band. Table 6 shows the decomposition result, based on estimates of
coe±cients along the diagonal and the constant in Table 5. For the entry and exit
cost decomposition involves the estimate of the constant, entry and exit costs cannot
be expressed in marginal probability terms of their own. A marginal probability
measure can be inferred for their sum, the hysteresis band.
Past presence increases the likelihood of future presence in a given location by
more than seventy percent in all but WEU, where the marginal e®ect predicts a more
than sixty percent increase. Long probit regressions con¯rm these magnitudes. The
total, however, hides the di®erential impact of entry and exit costs. Entry cost are
the largest in the distant low-income and high-income locations DEV and OIN, and
dominate exit costs there. Conversely, entry costs are the lowest in the nearby low-
income and high-income locations CEE and WEU, and signi¯cantly smaller than
exit costs. Among the exit costs are the opportunity costs of absence. German
MNEs are considerably less reluctant to leave distant locations DEV and OIN than
they abandon the neighboring locations CEE or WEU.
Indicators for past FDI presence may not exclusively capture sunk costs but also
¯rm heterogeneity. In long regressions, we look into the black box behind rule (5) and
26Table 7: Marginal Effects in Long Probit Regressions
CEE DEV OIN WEU
Predictors (t ¡ ¿) (1) (2) (3) (4)
FDI in CEE .619 .184 .472 -.361
(.234)¤¤¤ (.270) (.299) (.293)
FDI in DEV -.001 .800 -.094 -.054
(.109) (.111)¤¤¤ (.070) (.149)
FDI in OIN -.259 -.485 -.083 -.179
(.476) (.326) (.442) (1.035)
FDI in WEU .314 .108 .009 .983
(.203) (.297) (.298) (.019)¤¤¤
Home sector wage .0004 .001 .006 .019
(.004) (.004) (.003)¤ (.007)¤¤
Competitors' wages CEE -.050 -.023 .001 -.099
(.055) (.045) (.039) (.060)¤
Competitors' wages OIN -.001 -.002 -.028 .025
(.015) (.016) (.015)¤ (.020)
FDI in loc. £ Home sector wage -.0007 -.005 -.015 -.020
(.005) (.004) (.004)¤¤¤ (.008)¤¤¤
FDI in CEE £ Comp.s' wages CEE .054 -.060 -.093 .090
(.066) (.057) (.050)¤ (.083)
FDI in OIN £ Comp.s' wages OIN .010 .029 .035 .005
(.027) (.026) (.019)¤ (.034)
ln Count of host countries .036 .086 .031 .128
(.040) (.035)¤¤ (.028) (.053)¤¤
ln Employment .116 .057 .064 .153
(.026)¤¤¤ (.023)¤¤ (.021)¤¤¤ (.031)¤¤¤
ln Liability -.089 -.047 -.052 -.166
(.022)¤¤¤ (.019)¤¤ (.017)¤¤¤ (.026)¤¤¤
ln Capital-labor ratio .085 .023 .034 .072
(.022)¤¤¤ (.019) (.017)¤ (.026)¤¤¤
Obs. 2,413 2,413 2,413 2,413
Pseudo R2 .559 .523 .555 .457
Sources: midi and ustan 1996 to 2001 (unido wages), pooled sample of manufacturing MNEs
and their majority-owned foreign manufacturing a±liates with two-year selection lags (¿ = 2).
Standard errors in parentheses: ¤ signi¯cance at ten, ¤¤ ¯ve, ¤¤¤ one percent. Further regressors
(not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at ¯ve percent level in any location): Competitors' wages
DEV and WEU and their interactions with FDI presence in DEV and WEU, Competitors' hosts
ln Market access, Indic. of Headquarters West Germany, ln Equity, Parent pro¯ts/equity, Com-
petitors' hosts skill shares, Competitors' hosts distance, Competitors' hosts ln Consumption per
capita. Without wage-presence interactions, past presence has a marginal e®ect of .779 (standard
error .022) in CEE, .671 (.027) in DEV, .713 (.026) in OIN, and .747 (.020) in WEU. Locations:
CEE (Central and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized
countries), WEU (Western Europe).
27include ¯rm-level predictors as well as competitor-average host country attributes.
Table 7 presents the marginal e®ects for the full list of covariates.16 Among the
¯rm-level predictors, we include interactions between past presence indicators and
wages to capture the co-determining e®ect of wage di®erentials and an MNE's past
presence at a location.
In the long regressions of Table 7, past presence elsewhere (o® the diagonal) loses
predictive power. But past presence for the region itself continues to be a statistically
signi¯cant and salient predictor of presence (except for CEE because of the wage
interaction). When leaving interactions between wages and past presence out for a
comparison, past presence at the same location has a highly statistically signi¯cant
probability e®ect of .779 (standard error .022) in CEE, .671 (.027) in DEV, .713
(.026) in OIN, and .747 (.020) in WEU|similar to the marginal e®ects in the short
regression (last row in Table 6). These probability e®ects of past presence con¯rm
the importance of the hysteresis band. The MNE's number of host countries in the
past also signi¯cantly raises the likelihood of presence. German MNEs with large
home employment, low parent debt, and a high capital-labor ratio at the parent ¯rm
are signi¯cantly more likely to be present at most or all foreign locations within two
years.
Time and, by construction, competitor variation identi¯es wage e®ects. The
home wage has the expected positive sign in all regressions and is a signi¯cant pre-
dictor for presence in OIN and WEU, both by itself and in its interaction with past
presence. The negative coe±cients on the home wage interaction with past pres-
ence suggest that wage di®erentials matter less for the location decision of MNEs
that already own an a±liate in the region. With German wages partly controlling
for the wage di®erential between the foreign location and the home sector, several
foreign wages are statistically insigni¯cant predictors of location choice. Insigni¯-
cant coe±cients of host wages are common in the literature on location choice (e.g.
Devereux and Gri±th (1998) for U.S., Head and Mayer (2004) for Japanese, and
Buch, Kleinert, Lipponer, and Toubal (2005) for German MNEs). For estimation
of the cross-elasticity of labor demand at the extensive margin, however, only the
coe±cient on the German wage matters (because the extensive margin is only de-
¯ned for foreign labor demand). Bootstraps over both estimation stages will show
even for the statistically weak wage prediction of location selection into CEE that,
weighted with the strong labor demand e®ects of CEE selection, home wage levels
signi¯cantly a®ect the elasticities of labor substitution at the extensive margin.
Further covariates (not reported) include competitors' wages in OIN and WEU
and their interactions with past presence in DEEV and WEU, competitors' hosts'
16For continuous variables, marginal e®ects are °`¤ = @©(¢)=@zj;t¡¿ = Á(¢)°`; for indicator vari-
ables, marginal e®ects are the di®erences in ©(¢) between setting the indicator to 1 or 0 (evaluated
at the sample mean ¹ zj;t¡¿, and the variance-covariance matrix estimator being transformed with
the delta method). Sample size drops from 3,392 to 2,414 mainly because of missing information
from parent balance sheets.
28market access, competitors' hosts' skill shares, competitors' hosts' distance, competi-
tors' hosts' per-capita consumption, an indicator of parents' headquarters in West
Germany, equity, and parent pro¯ts/equity. None of those covariates is signi¯cant
at the ¯ve-percent level in any location. To tentatively control for an outside margin
of arm's length trade between independent ¯rms, we also included a set of sector
and location speci¯c import and export measures but found the trade variables not
to be signi¯cant predictors of location choice; here we leave them out.
Nonparametric propensity score approximations. We estimate the propen-
sity score of location choice with a third-order polynomial in wages, market access,
and the count of an MNE's past host countries, alongside the same linear predic-
tors as for probit estimation. The predicted propensity scores are .338 for CEE,
.291 for DEV, .262 for OIN and .617 for WEU|slightly under-predicting the ac-
tual frequencies of presence in Table 4 but re°ecting the relative frequencies across
locations.
Table 8 reports coe±cient estimates by location. Marginal e®ects are close to
those in the probit regressions. Estimates of the hysteresis band along the diagonal
of past presence indicators continue to have a magnitude similar to probit estimation.
When leaving interactions between wages and past presence out, past presence at the
same location has a highly statistically signi¯cant probability e®ect of .759 (standard
error .018) in CEE, .668 (.020) in DEV, .711 (.017) in OIN, and .707 (.024) in WEU|
again close to the marginal e®ects in the short regression (last row in Table 6).
Inclusion of wage interactions with past presence shifts much predictive power to
the interaction terms in DEV and all predictive power to the interaction terms in
OIN. In WEU, the wage-presence interaction countervails the high marginal e®ects
of past presence.
We present F-tests of joint signi¯cance of individual wages for p values at or
below the .1 threshold. Similar to probit estimation, polynomial terms that involve
home wages predict location choice more successfully than most foreign wages (ex-
cept OIN wages). Home wages are the important predictors for cross-elasticities of
labor substitution at the extensive margin. Using unido wages, series terms involv-
ing the home sector wage predict selection into DEV and OIN at the ¯ve percent
signi¯cance level.
Signi¯cant parent-level covariates from probit remain signi¯cant predictors under
nonparametric estimation, excepting the host country count variable. Similarly,
insigni¯cant parent-level covariates remain insigni¯cant.
5.2 Translog estimation with selectivity correction
We proceed to estimation of the short-run translog cost function and include pre-
dicted selection hazards from probit estimation as regressors in the equation system
(parametric selectivity correction, Assumption 1). Alternatively, we include pre-
29Table 8: Marginal Effects in Nonparametric Probability Model
CEE DEV OIN WEU
Predictors (t ¡ ¿) (1) (2) (3) (4)
FDI in CEE .644 .108 .193 -.207
(.145)¤¤¤ (.149) (.138) (.184)
FDI in DEV -.070 .383 -.065 -.007
(.088) (.116)¤¤¤ (.083) (.107)
FDI in OIN .016 .060 .068 .075
(.553) (.568) (.550) (.687)
FDI in WEU .174 -.122 -.057 1.082
(.222) (.215) (.201) (.258)¤¤¤
FDIa in loc. £ Home sector wage .001 .006 -.010 -.004
(.003) (.004)¤ (.003)¤¤¤ (.004)
FDI in OIN £ Comp.s' wages OIN -.001 -.002 .031 -.003
(.018) (.018) (.017)¤ (.022)
Series terms of wages: p-values from F tests
Home sector wage terms .041 .021
Competitors' CEE wage terms
Competitors' DEV wage terms
Competitors' OIN wage terms .012 .052
Competitors' WEU wage terms
ln Employment .064 .039 .049 .090
(.014)¤¤¤ (.014)¤¤¤ (.013)¤¤¤ (.017)¤¤¤
ln Liability -.046 -.028 -.036 -.094
(.011)¤¤¤ (.012)¤¤ (.011)¤¤¤ (.014)¤¤¤
ln Capital-labor ratio .046 .020 .028 .045
(.011)¤¤¤ (.012)¤ (.011)¤¤¤ (.014)¤¤¤
Obs. 2,413 2,413 2,413 2,413
R2 .666 .618 .633 .556
Sources: midi and ustan 1996 to 2001 (unido wages), pooled sample of manufacturing MNEs
and their majority-owned foreign manufacturing a±liates with two-year selection lags (¿ = 2).
Standard errors in parentheses: ¤ signi¯cance at ten, ¤¤ ¯ve, ¤¤¤ one percent. Further regressors
(not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at ¯ve percent level in any location): Interactions of com-
petitors' wages in CEE/DEV/WEU with FDI presence in CEE/DEV/WEU, Competitors' hosts
ln Market access, ln Count of host countries, Indic. of Headquarters West Germany, ln Equity,
Parent pro¯ts/equity, Competitors' hosts skill shares, Competitors' hosts distance, Competitors'
hosts ln Cons. p.c. Without wage-presence interactions, past presence has a marginal e®ect of .759
(standard error .018) in CEE, .668 (.020) in DEV, .711 (.017) in OIN, and .707 (.024) in WEU.
Locations: CEE (Central and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas In-
dustrialized countries), WEU (Western Europe).
aFDI presence in regression location.
30dicted propensity scores from nonparametric selection estimation (Assumptions 2
or 3).
Translog cost function estimation. Table 9 presents estimates of translog cost
function equations for 1,640 stacked MNE observations between 1998 and 2001.
(We lose observations mainly because of missing wage information at a±liate lo-
cations.) Coe±cient estimates are from iterated seemingly unrelated regressions of
transformed wage bill shares on their translog predictors for four out of ¯ve loca-
tions, excluding home. For the regression, wage bill shares and covariates are scaled
by observation-speci¯c cost-wage ratios to remove upper truncation. Beyond the
reported wage coe±cients, the equations include the full sets of turnover and ¯xed
asset regressors, the scaled equivalent of the constant, and indicators of absence
from all other locations. All but two wage coe±cients in Table 9 are signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero at the one percent level, and all coe±cients but one are signi¯cant
at the ¯ve percent level in each, parametric and nonparametric, regression. Most
coe±cients on output and ¯xed assets (not reported) are similarly highly signi¯cant.
Equation estimates in the upper panel of Table 9 include the predicted selectivity
hazards (inverses of Mills ratios) by location (Assumption 1). Selectivity hazards
are statistically di®erent from zero at the one percent level in all equations except
DEV (signi¯cance at ten-percent level). The lower panel presents estimates from
nonparametric selectivity correction (Assumption 2), using third-order polynomials
in the location's propensity score interacted with indicators for presence at all other
locations. Â2 tests on the series terms overwhelmingly reject their joint equality to
zero. The translog cost function regressors predict the bulk of labor demand vari-
ation across locations, with R2 regression ¯ts ranging between .92 and .97 for all
equations. Regression ¯ts are similar under parametric and nonparametric selectiv-
ity correction. Overall, we consider the signi¯cance of selectivity correction terms
strong evidence for the importance of the extensive margin.
Tests for parametric selectivity correction. We test whether Assumption 1
for parametric selection correction is satis¯ed in our context. There are two cases:
(a) the part of the selection shock that correlates with labor demand shocks is an
MNE-speci¯c disturbance and does not vary by location, and (b) the labor-demand
related part of the selection shock varies by location but is independent of labor
demand shocks in other locations. We test the two cases in turn. Tests fail to reject
case (a), but they do reject case (b). We consider the assumptions of case (a) both
economically plausible and statistically acceptable.
Consider (a) MNE-speci¯c selection shocks whose labor demand related part
does not vary by location. This case implies that the covariance between selection
disturbances is the same for any pair of locations k 6= `. We obtain estimates of
those covariances from multivariate probit estimation of simultaneous selection into
the four foreign locations. In the cross section of MNEs in 2000 with multivariate
31Table 9: Translog Cost Parameter Estimates
Labor cost shares in: CEE DEV OIN WEU
(transformed) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Parametric Selectivity Correction (Assumption 1)
ln Wages
HOM .020 -.002 .078 .183
(.001)¤¤¤ (.0008)¤¤ (.004)¤¤¤ (.005)¤¤¤
CEE -.008 -.001 -.003 -.008
(.0008)¤¤¤ (.0002)¤¤¤ (.0004)¤¤¤ (.0005)¤¤¤
DEV -.001 .001 -.002 .004
(.0003)¤¤¤ (.0008) (.0004)¤¤¤ (.0006)¤¤¤
OIN -.003 -.002 -.112 .039
(.00007)¤¤¤ (.00007)¤¤¤ (.003)¤¤¤ (.001)¤¤¤
WEU -.008 .004 .039 -.219
(.0001)¤¤¤ (.0001)¤¤¤ (.001)¤¤¤ (.004)¤¤¤
Selectivity hazard 81.487 32.872 33.468 92.618
(15.830)¤¤¤ (17.751)¤ (12.462)¤¤¤ (16.618)¤¤¤
R2 .945 .950 .966 .932
Nonparametric Selectivity Correction (Assumption 2)
ln Wages
HOM .023 .0003 .075 .149
(.001)¤¤¤ (.001) (.005)¤¤¤ (.006)¤¤¤
CEE -.008 -.003 -.003 -.009
(.0008)¤¤¤ (.0004)¤¤¤ (.0005)¤¤¤ (.0006)¤¤¤
DEV -.003 .002 -.002 .003
(.0004)¤¤¤ (.0009)¤¤ (.0005)¤¤¤ (.0007)¤¤¤
OIN -.003 -.002 -.109 .040
(.0005)¤¤¤ (.0005)¤¤¤ (.005)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤
WEU -.009 .003 .040 -.183
(.0006)¤¤¤ (.0007)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤ (.006)¤¤¤
Series terms
Â2 tests (p-value) 517.4 (.000) 376.0 (.000) 117.8 (.000) 198.9 (.000)
R2 .954 .955 .965 .926
Sources: midi and ustan 1996 to 2001 (unido wages). Stacked observations of 1,640 MNEs.
Further regressors: ln Turnover, ln Fixed assets, Absence indicators, Transformed constant (in
parametric selectivity regression). Standard errors in parentheses: ¤ signi¯cance at ten, ¤¤ ¯ve,
¤¤¤ one percent. Standard errors corrected for ¯rst-stage estimation of selectivity hazards (hence
not symmetric on restricted coe±cients). Locations: HOM (omitted), CEE (Central and Eastern
Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU (Western
Europe).
32probit regressors from 1996, we fail to reject the joint equality of six correlation
coe±cients between the four equations with a Â2 test statistic of 4:63 (p value .592).
Under a restriction on the selection disturbance, another implication of case (a) is
that, if an MNE is neither present in all locations nor absent from all locations,
the choices of presence and absence must be consistent with a location-independent
MNE-speci¯c selection shock for all locations. We calculate the regression prediction
for all MNEs that are not omnipresent, pick the maximum probit prediction among
all locations of absence and the minimum probit prediction among all locations of
presence thus stacking the cards of the test against case (a). Although 191 out of
1,941 observations show the wrong pattern, a one-sided t-test of the null hypothesis
that absence and presence predictions are reversed is rejected overwhelmingly with
a t statistic of 77:4 (zero p value).
Second, consider (b) location-varying selection shocks that are independent of
labor demand shocks in other locations. This assumption implies that labor demand
residuals from one location must have no correlation with labor demand residuals
from any other location. We reject this hypothesis for three out of six pairs of the
four location residuals with p values below .01, for two pairs with p values below .1,
but fail to reject zero correlation in one remaining case (CEE-OIN).
While case (b) is rejected, there is no evidence against case (a) where selection
disturbances correlate with labor demand shocks only through an MNE-speci¯c
shock but not through location-speci¯c shocks. Note that cross-location correla-
tions of labor demand errors are not evidence against case (a) because MNE-speci¯c
selection shocks themselves induce a correlation between the labor demand distur-
bances across locations. As discussed before, case (a) is plausible in economic terms.
Suppose selection disturbances include both host country-speci¯c parts such as, for
example, surprising changes to pro¯t repatriation policies and include MNE-speci¯c
parts. Changes to host country repatriation policies a®ect the entry decision. But
once the MNE operates in the host country, it minimizes costs irrespective of entry-
relevant host-country shocks so that cost function disturbances are unrelated to
the entry-relevant policy shocks. Given supportive test results and the economic
plausibility of case (a), we regard estimation under parametric selectivity correction
(Assumption 1) a relevant benchmark.
Elasticities of multinational labor substitution. Table 10 shows own-wage
and cross-wage substitution elasticities for permanent wage changes by one percent
in di®erent locations, separately for the extensive and the intensive margins. There
is no well-de¯ned extensive margin for selection into the home location (Germany)
in a sample of MNEs, which are observable to the statistician only when active in the
home location. The standard errors are from 200 bootstraps over the two estimation
steps of parametric selectivity corrected translog estimates (Assumption 1). One
margin at a time is set to zero to isolate the e®ect at the other margin. Cross-price
elasticities are a±ne transformations of translog coe±cients (equation (10)). While
33Table 10: Cross-wage Elasticities under Parametric Selectivity
Wage change (by 1%) in
Employment HOM CEE DEV OIN WEU
change (%) in (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HOM intensive -.574¤¤¤ .051¤¤¤ .011 .150¤¤¤ .361¤¤¤
CEE intensive only 1.596¤¤¤ -1.295¤¤¤ -.039 -.081 -.181
extensive only .795¤¤¤ -1.250¤¤¤ .071 .155 -.097
DEV intensive only .651 -.071 -.912¤¤¤ -.116 .448¤¤
extensive only .772¤¤¤ -.250 -.982¤¤¤ .324 .656
OIN intensive only 2.328¤¤¤ -.040 -.031 -3.160¤¤¤ .903¤¤¤
extensive only .960¤¤¤ -.288 .032 -2.597¤ .365
WEUintensive only 2.214¤¤¤ -.036¤ .048¤¤ .358¤¤¤ -2.584¤¤¤
extensive only 1.016¤¤¤ -.341 .128 1.137¤ -.951¤¤¤
Sources: midi and ustan 1996 to 2001 (unido wages). Elasticities at the extensive and intensive
margins from 1,640 stacked MNE observations. Underlying labor demand estimates from para-
metric selectivity-corrected ISUR estimates (Assumption 1, Table 9). Standard errors from 200
bootstraps: ¤¤ signi¯cance at ¯ve, ¤¤¤ one percent. Locations: HOM (Germany), CEE (Central
and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU
(Western Europe).
log wage e®ects on wage bill shares are additive in translog estimation at the intensive
and the extensive margin (equation (6)), cross-wage substitution elasticities are not.
Own-wage elasticities along the diagonal|for both the intensive and the ex-
tensive margins|are uniformly negative, and signi¯cantly negative, as production
theory requires. While this might be expected for estimates at the intensive mar-
gin, it is a reassuring ¯nding for estimates at the extensive margin. Note that we
impose linear homogeneity in factor prices and symmetry of wage coe±cients at
the intensive margin through constraints on the translog regression, but we do not
restrict estimates at the extensive margin because those constraints are not well
de¯ned at the observation level|neither under parametric nor nonparametric se-
lectivity correction. The own-wage elasticity of substitution is considerably larger
in most foreign locations than at home, suggesting that MNE employment abroad
responds more sensitively to labor costs there than home employment responds to
home wages.
Cross-wage elasticities in the ¯rst row (foreign wage e®ects on home employment)
and in the ¯rst column (home wage e®ects on foreign employment) are signi¯cantly
positive for eleven out of thirteen estimates at the intensive and the extensive mar-
gins. A one-percent reduction in the wage in CEE, for instance, is associated with a
.05 percent drop in home employment at German MNE parents. In contrast, a one-
percent increase in the German sector wage is associated with a 1.6 percent boost
34to MNE employment in CEE at the intensive margin and a .8 percent boost at the
extensive margin. So, home and CEE employment are substitutes within MNEs.
The large di®erence in cross-wage e®ects is consistent with two main facts. First,
employment at German MNE parents is larger in levels than at their CEE a±liates
so that a smaller percentage wage drop in Germany means a larger reduction in
employment in absolute terms. Second, CEE workers tend to be less productive
than German workers, which is re°ected in the translog cost function coe±cients.
The extensive margin is a noticeable component of adjustment, beyond its crucial
role in correcting cost function estimates for location selectivity bias. Elasticities
at the extensive margin are strictly positive. So, home and foreign employment are
substitutes within MNEs not only at the intensive but also at the extensive margin.
Although the CEE and DEV home wage e®ects on selection were not statistically
di®erent from zero on the ¯rst stage with probit (Table 7), the strong signi¯cance
of the selection e®ect on labor demand on the second stage in CEE (selectivity
hazard coe±cient in Table 9) turns home wage e®ects into signi¯cant predictors
of employment substitution at the extensive margin. Beyond the marginal wage
coe±cients from two-step estimation, observed wage bill shares provide information
for elasticity estimation and thus contribute to the signi¯cance of elasticity estimates.
Elasticities at the extensive margin are smaller in magnitude than at the intensive
margin in the geographically close locations CEE and WEU, and in OIN. In DEV,
however, the extensive margin dominates the insigni¯cant elasticity at the intensive
margin and we ¯nd a .8 percent increase in DEV employment in response to a
one-percent home wage increase|similar in magnitude to that in CEE. In CEE, a
one-percent increase in the German home wage is also associated with a .8 percent
increase in MNE employment at the extensive margin, if no adjustment occurs at
the intensive margin.
We also add the intensive and extensive wage e®ects on wage bills and compute
the total home wage elasticities of foreign labor demand. We ¯nd highly signi¯-
cant estimates for the total elasticities at three locations: :61 in CEE, 2:51 in OIN
and 2:45 in WEU (signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at the one-percent level). Our
200 bootstraps allow us to test whether the elasticities at the intensive margin are
signi¯cantly di®erent from the total elasticities. We reject their equality for DEV,
OIN and WEU (with t statistics between 2.1 and 16.6) on unido wages and reject
their equality for all locations (t statistics between 4.1 and 21.4) on oww wages,
corroborating the importance of the extensive margin.
Cross-wage estimates beyond the ¯rst row and column are for the most part
not statistically di®erent from zero. Notable exceptions at the intensive margin are
signi¯cant pairs of positive cross-wage e®ects involving WEU: on the one hand of
OIN on WEU (.36) and vice versa (.90), and on the other hand of DEV on WEU
(.05) and vice versa (.45). The signi¯cantly positive and mutually consistent e®ects
suggest that MNE employment is a substitute at the intensive margin between OIN
and WEU and between DEV and WEU. The substitution e®ect is also corroborated
35Table 11: Foreign-Wage Elasticities of Home Employment
Wage change (1%) in
Home employment HOM CEE DEV OIN WEU Obs.
change (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Stacking
Ass. 1, unido 98-01 -.574 .051 .011 .150 .361 1,640
(.062)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤¤ (.008) (.028)¤¤¤ (.037)¤¤¤
Ass. 1, unido 00 -.631 .062 .034 .202 .332 322
(.115)¤¤¤ (.026)¤¤ (.021) (.071)¤¤¤ (.078)¤¤¤
Ass. 1, oww 98-01 -.477 .051 -.002 .209 .219 1,458
(.053)¤¤¤ (.010)¤¤¤ (.005) (.030)¤¤¤ (.037)¤¤¤
Ass. 1, ubs 98-01 -.434 .013 .008 .078 .336 1,614
(.056)¤¤¤ (.006)¤¤ (.011) (.031)¤¤ (.038)¤¤¤
Ass. 2, unido 98-01 -.533 .055 .014 .146 .319 1,640
(.048)¤¤¤ (.006)¤¤¤ (.006)¤¤ (.026)¤¤¤ (.032)¤¤¤
Ass. 3, unido 98-01 -.525 .053 .015 .144 .313 1,640
(.051)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤ (.024)¤¤¤ (.035)¤¤¤
Omnipresent MNEs
Ass. 1, unido 98-01 -1.354 .090 -.021 .526 .758 93
(.209)¤¤¤ (.104) (.048) (.135)¤¤¤ (.143)¤¤¤
Sources: midi and ustan 1996 to 2001 (unido wages). Elasticities of wage e®ects on home
employment (¯rst row of elasticity matrix) at the intensive margin. Standard errors from 200
bootstraps: ¤¤ signi¯cance at ¯ve, ¤¤¤ one percent. Locations: HOM (Germany), CEE (Central
and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU
(Western Europe).
by a positive cross-wage elasticity between OIN and WEU (1.14) at the extensive
margin.
5.3 Speci¯cation comparisons
To assess the robustness of our estimates, we compare several further speci¯cations
and report the ¯rst rows of the cross-wage elasticity matrices (foreign wage e®ects
on home employment) in Table 11, and the ¯rst columns separately by intensive and
extensive margin in Tables 12 and 13 (home wage e®ects on foreign employment).
Foreign-wage elasticities of home employment are robust across speci¯cations
(Table 11). Estimates on our benchmark sample (¯rst row) with unido wages and
MNEs between 1998 and 2001 under Assumption 1 conform closely to several other
speci¯cations. The similarity between the 1998-2001 MNE sample and the single
cross section of MNEs in 2000 (with location choice in 1996) in the second row is
consistent with the view that cross sectional and not time series variation is the
36Table 12: Home-Wage Elasticities at the Intensive Margin
Home wage change (1%), by regression speci¯cation
Stacking Omnipr.
unido unido ubs oww unido unido unido
98-01 00 98-01 98-01 98-01 98-01 98-01
Emplmt. Ass. 1 Ass. 1 Ass. 1 Ass. 1 Ass. 2 Ass. 3 Ass. 1
chg. (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CEE 1.596 1.810 1.366 .603 1.707 1.648 3.535
(.218)¤¤¤ (.748)¤¤ (.247)¤¤¤ (.272)¤¤ (.215)¤¤¤ (.226)¤¤¤ (4.062)
DEV .651 1.534 -.147 .322 .807 .880 -.444
(.466) (1.004) (.480) (.430) (.323)¤¤ (.397)¤¤ (1.072)
OIN 2.328 2.573 3.540 .979 2.255 2.235 1.938
(.432)¤¤¤ (.888)¤¤¤ (.516)¤¤¤ (.399)¤¤ (.376)¤¤¤ (.363)¤¤¤ (.482)¤¤¤
WEU 2.214 1.860 2.087 1.826 1.951 1.915 2.851
(.224)¤¤¤ (.407)¤¤¤ (.353)¤¤¤ (.197)¤¤¤ (.191)¤¤¤ (.205)¤¤¤ (.494)¤¤¤
Obs. 1,640 322 1,458 1,614 1,640 1,640 93
Sources: midi and ustan 1996 to 2001 (unido wages). Elasticities of home wage e®ects on foreign
employment (¯rst column of elasticity matrix) at the intensive margin. Standard errors from 200
bootstraps: ¤¤ signi¯cance at ¯ve, ¤¤¤ one percent. Locations: HOM (Germany), CEE (Central
and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU
(Western Europe).
main source of identi¯cation at the intensive margin. oww and ubs wage data in
the third and fourth row result in smaller estimation samples and perhaps introduce
attenuation bias for some coe±cients (the ubs wage data are particularly sketchy
for CEE). Coe±cient estimates are nevertheless similar across wage data. Non-
parametric estimation does not yield statistically di®erent estimates, neither under
Assumption 2 nor 3, excepting DEV. The sample of 93 omnipresent MNEs between
1996 and 2001 is small but results in signi¯cant outcome estimates on the second
stage (we predict selectivity hazards from ¯rst-stage regressions on the full sample);
the magnitude of coe±cient estimates, when signi¯cant, is considerably larger than
for the stacked samples, suggesting that foreign employment at omnipresent MNEs
responds more elastically to home wages. Estimates for DEV are not signi¯cant
except for nonparametric speci¯cations. This is consistent with the assertion that
higher order series terms in the outcome regression help remove bias that parametric
selectivity correction cannot prevent with a single selectivity hazard.
Home-wage elasticities of foreign employment at the intensive margin (Table 12)
are robust too. Estimates on our benchmark sample (now in the ¯rst column)
conform closely to several other speci¯cations. In fact, the comments on the rows of
Table 11 above apply also to the columns of Table 12, except only that the coe±cient
estimates for the sample of omnipresent MNEs now closely resemble those from other
37Table 13: Home-Wage Elasticities at the Extensive Margin
Home wage change (1%), by regression speci¯cation
Stacking Omnipr.
unido unido ubs oww unido unido unido
98-01 00 98-01 98-01 98-01 98-01 98-01
Emplmt. Ass. 1 Ass. 1 Ass. 1 Ass. 1 Ass. 2 Ass. 3 Ass. 1
chg. (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CEE .795 .838 .395 .524 .869 -.040 .643
(.201)¤¤¤ (.232)¤¤¤ (.380) (.197)¤¤¤ (3.282) (9.586) (.300)¤¤
DEV .772 .572 .975 .626 -9.719 3.941 .592
(.162)¤¤¤ (.252)¤¤ (.298)¤¤¤ (.892) (8.133) (17.680) (.503)
OIN .960 1.116 1.431 1.160 .833 -4.249 .345
(.340)¤¤¤ (.392)¤¤¤ (.845)¤ (.625)¤ (3.669) (7.373) (.331)
WEU 1.016 1.183 1.561 1.808 1.527 -2.457 .719
(.171)¤¤¤ (.301)¤¤¤ (.372)¤¤¤ (.504)¤¤¤ (1.999) (3.141) (.096)¤¤¤
Obs. 1,640 322 1,458 1,614 1,640 1,640 93
Sources: midi and ustan 1996 to 2001 (unido wages). Elasticities of home wage e®ects on foreign
employment (¯rst column of elasticity matrix) at the extensive margin. Standard errors from
200 bootstraps: ¤¤ signi¯cance at ¯ve, ¤¤¤ one percent. Locations: CEE (Central and Eastern
Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU (Western
Europe).
speci¯cations.
At the extensive margin, home-wage elasticities of foreign employment (Table 13)
are (highly) signi¯cant in the parametric speci¯cations (columns 1 through 4), for
all wage data and in the year 2000 cross section (with unido wages). Coe±cient
magnitudes vary slightly more across speci¯cations than they do at the intensive
margin. Nonparametric estimates of elasticities at the extensive margin are sample
means of the ¯rst derivatives of our third-order polynomial series expansions. We
compute the elasticities after dropping outlier predictions, for which the ¯rst-stage
probability model results in propensity scores outside the zero-one range. Nonpara-
metric estimates for the extensive margin (columns 5 and 6 of Table 13) are not
statistically di®erent from zero but similar in magnitude when plausible (column 5,
excepting DEV). Although the inclusion of nonparametric series terms in translog
estimation yields more precise estimates of intensive margin coe±cients (Tables 11
and 12) by approximating disturbance components beyond the parametric selec-
tivity hazard, the series terms do not seem to provide a precise estimate of the
extensive margin itself.We nevertheless view the similarity between parametric and
plausible nonparametric estimates as an indication that our parametric benchmark
estimates of the extensive margin are reasonable. Point estimates for omnipresent
MNEs (column 7) are smaller than in the benchmark speci¯cation, arguably because
38Table 14: Counterfactual Employment Effects of a One-percent Re-
duction in the Home-Foreign Wage Gap
Permanent wage gap reduction
by one percent between Home and
Employment e®ect CEE DEV OIN WEU
at the intensive margin on (1) (2) (3) (4)
Homea 728 161 2,141 5,143
(101)¤¤¤ (118) (401)¤¤¤ (526)¤¤¤
Foreignb extensive margin -1,954 -2,567 -3,066 -4,010
(493)¤¤¤ (537)¤¤¤ (1084)¤¤¤ (674)¤¤¤
Foreignb total -3,951 -2,128 -7,999 -9,656
(734)¤¤¤ (1698) (1933)¤¤¤ (1162)¤¤¤
Sources: Own calculations based on selectivity corrected translog estimates for 1,640 German
manufacturing MNEs and their majority-owned foreign manufacturing a±liates in midi and ustan
between 1996 and 2001 (unido wages). Point estimates from parametric selectivity correction
(Assumption 1, Table 10) multiplied by employment in 2000 (Table 1). Standard errors from 200
bootstraps: ¤¤ signi¯cance at ¯ve, ¤¤¤ one percent. Home (Germany), CEE (Central and Eastern
Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU (Western
Europe).
aGap reducing foreign wage increases (by one percent).
bGap reducing home wage reduction (by one percent).
this selected sample expands to foreign locations more frequently.
Taken together, our results con¯rm the statistical plausibility of the benchmark
estimates from parametric selectivity correction (Assumption 1). Several tests for
the validity of Assumption 1 fail to reject the identifying hypothesis that selection
shocks correlate with labor demand shocks only through an MNE-speci¯c error but
not through location-speci¯c errors. Nonparametric estimation yields very similar
and highly signi¯cant elasticity estimates at the intensive margin. At the extensive
margin, the benchmark estimates from parametric selectivity correction are highly
signi¯cant but nonparametric estimates fail to attain signi¯cance. In short, the
benchmark estimates from parametric selectivity correction are statistically robust.
We now turn to the economic implications of our estimates for multinational labor
substitution.
5.4 Counterfactual Evaluation
Our hypothetical experiment is a permanent change in the wage di®erential between
home and foreign locations. How much larger would parent employment be if the
wage gap to foreign locations narrowed? How much smaller would a±liate employ-
ment be? Counterfactual predictions in Table 14 give answers to these questions.
39We use the home-wage elasticities of foreign labor demand and the foreign-wage
elasticities of home labor demand from our selectivity corrected translog benchmark
estimates for the 1998-2001 MNE sample (Table 10). These estimates re°ect the
employment responses at the mean MNE (the mean MNE in the stacked sample
has propensities of presence abroad as in the ¯rst row of Table 4). We multiply
the elasticity estimates with the workforce totals in Table 1 and obtain the implied
employment changes from one-percent increases in wages by margin.
A one percent smaller wage gap between Germany and locations in CEE, for
instance, is associated with around 700 more jobs at German parents and 4,000
less jobs at a±liates in CEE. CEE a±liates tend to have smaller work forces and,
arguably, lower labor productivity than German establishments so that employment
in CEE is more sensitive to home wage changes than home employment responds to
foreign wages. The labor substitution e®ects of one-percent wage changes between
home locations and CEE are smaller than the e®ects relative to OIN or WEU. In
absolute magnitude, however, a closing of the HOM-CEE wag gap by half at constant
elasticities results in larger employment e®ects than a reduction of the HOM-OIN
or HOM-WEU wage gaps by half. Using country populations as weights for location
mean unido wages, CEE wages are, on average, 9.9 percent of the German level
in 2000 (population-weighted mean oww wages in CEE are 9.8 percent). If the
estimated elasticities of substitution are constant at all levels of wages, an increase in
CEE wages by 450%(= ((1¡:099)=2)=:099) to reduce the wage gap vis µ a vis Germany
by half would bring 330,000 (= 730¢450) counterfactual manufacturing jobs (with a
standard error of 45,000 jobs) to Germany|around a quarter of the estimated home
employment at German manufacturing MNEs (Table 1). If international wage gaps
shrink at a similar rate as per capita GDP converges to steady state and Germany
is close to its steady state, the CEE-German wage gap would take around 35 years
to contract to half its present size (Barro and Sala i Martin 1992). The unido
wage level in WEU is 78.6 (96.1) percent of that in Germany so that an increase in
WEU wages by 14% (2%) to cut the gap in about half would attract 70,000 (4,000)
counterfactual manufacturing jobs to the German plants of German manufacturing
MNEs.
Elasticities of labor substitution are local properties of the MNE's cost function,
however, and the assumption of a constant elasticity of substitution at all wage
levels is coarse. The rough calculations are merely intended to put an economic
meaning to the abstract elasticity ¯gures. In our view, the magnitude of our calcu-
lations for constant elasticities nonetheless underscores the potential importance of
job substitution within MNEs for labor market outcomes.
406 Conclusion
While the public discourse over outsourcing seems to have settled on the idea that
multinational enterprises (MNEs) substitute jobs at home for foreign employment,
economic studies on MNE labor demand across locations have found weak or no
evidence of job substitution. We integrate two distinct branches of the literature|
one on predictions of MNEs' location choices, and one on labor substitutability
across established MNE locations|into a single econometric model that corrects
cost function estimation for location selectivity. In our framework, multinational
labor demand responds to wage di®erentials across locations both at the extensive
margin, when an MNE expands into foreign locations, and at the intensive margin,
when an MNE reallocates jobs across existing foreign a±liates. We derive condi-
tions for common Heckman (1979) selectivity corrections, location by location, and
for nonparametric identi¯cation. Cost function estimation, however, conditions on
MNE output. The empirical exercise thus leaves aside the counterfactual question
how the market share and size of an MNE would di®er if its access to foreign lo-
cations were limited in spite of global product market competition. This matter is
part of our ongoing research.
Empirical evidence on German manufacturing MNEs shows that ¯rms change
multinational presence only infrequently and hardly alter their number of a±liates
within regions. These infrequent changes to multinational presence at the extensive
margin give rise to rare but salient labor demand e®ects in response to permanent
wage di®erentials across locations. With every percentage increase in Central and
Eastern European wages, German manufacturing MNEs are found to allocate 700
MNE jobs to Germany. With every percentage increase in German wages, German
MNEs allocate 2,000 jobs to Central and Eastern Europe at the extensive margin
and 4,000 jobs in total. Given the sizeable wage di®erential between Germany and
Central and Eastern Europe (requiring a 450 percent increase in Eastern European
wages in 2000 to reduce the gap by half), we conclude that international wage
di®erentials have a salient impact on multinational labor substitution.
41Appendix
A A Model of the MNE
We think of an MNE's choice of multinational production and sales as a two-stage
decision problem. At moment t ¡ ¿ (i.e. ¿ periods prior to production and sales),
MNE j determines at which locations to produce and faces uncertainty over other
MNEs' future output qi6=j;t, input prices wt, and its own realized output qjt. With
its location choice, the MNE also chooses its optimal capital stock vector kjt across
L locations.
On the second stage at time t, all uncertainty is removed and MNE j chooses
output qjt given its cost function (or, by duality, optimal factor employment given its
production function). The optimal quantity choice q¤
jt at time t can be characterized















(` = 1;:::;L); (A1)
where p`(¢) is the price of a good from location ` as a function of competitors' and
own worldwide output, and "
q`
jt is the elasticity of demand for q`
jt with respect to
price p`. By the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, q¤
jt=0 if inequality holds. So, even if MNE
j is present at location `, it may ¯nd it optimal to produce q`
jt=0 once factor price
and competitors' output are revealed.
On the ¯rst stage, MNE j's linear programming problem can be characterized
























j;t¡¿ denotes MNE j's relevant ¯xed costs for presence at location ` and ´`
j;t¡¿
is an MNE-speci¯c disturbance. Expectations depend on MNE j's information set
zj;t¡¿. MNE j's linear programming problem on the ¯rst stage involves the simul-
taneous evaluation of (A2) for each location ` given the 2L¡1 possible combinations
of outputs at all remaining locations L¡1.
For its location choice on the ¯rst stage, an MNE j maximizes its expected
pro¯ts Ej;t¡¿[¦jt] where expectations are conditional on the MNE's information set
in period t ¡ ¿. The MNE can produce the vector of outputs qjt = (q1
jt;:::;qL
jt)0 at
L locations (` = 1;:::;L). So, future expected pro¯ts are
Ej;t¡¿ [p(qi6=j;t;qjt)
0 ¢ qjt ¡ Cjt(qjt;kjt;wt)]: (A3)
The estimated presence rule (5) in the text follows using expected pro¯ts (A3) in
criterion (A2).
42B Multiproduct translog cost function
Consider the short-run multiproduct translog function with quasi-¯xed capital:17

























































































By Shepard's (1953) lemma, MNE j's demand for employment y`
jt is equal to
@Cjt=@w`
t so that the wage bill share s`
jt ´ w`
ty`
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for ` = 1;:::;L. We transform these L equations into L simultaneous labor de-
mand functions by multiplying the dependent variable and all regressors with the
observation-speci¯c scalars Cjt=w`






With L locations, there are L(L¡1)=2 symmetry restrictions ±k` = ±`k for any k;`.
Linear homogeneity in factor prices requires that
PL
`=1 ®` = 1 and that
PL





`=1 ±m` = 0 for all m. We impose those restrictions on
estimation but do not constrain estimates of factor price coe±cients at the extensive
margin. We do not impose any returns-to-scale restrictions.
C Currency conversion and de°ation
We convert all economic data of foreign a±liates into euro (EUR) and de°ate them.
In BuBa's original midi data, all information on foreign a±liates is reported in
German currency using the exchange rate at the closing date of the foreign a±liate's
balance sheet. We apply the following de°ation and currency conversion method to
all ¯nancial variables. Deutschmark (DEM) ¯gures are converted into euro ¯gures at
17Slaughter (2000) adds ln(k=q) terms to a version of (B1). Given the additive logarithmic struc-
ture, this is equivalent to an a±ne transformation of the parameter pairs (®k;³k) and (¹k;`;·k;`)
because ln(k=q) = lnk ¡ lnq.
43the rate 1/1.95583 (the conversion rate at inception of the euro in 1999). (i) We use
the market exchange rate on the end-of-month day closest to an a±liate's balance
sheet closing date to convert the DEM or EUR ¯gures into local currency for every
a±liate. This reverses the conversion applied to the questionnaires at the date of
reporting. (ii) A CPI factor for every country de°ates the foreign-currency ¯nancial
¯gures to the December-1998 real value in local currency. (iii) For each country,
the average of all end-of-month exchange rates vis-µ a-vis the DEM or EUR between
January 1996 and December 2001 is used as a proxy for purchasing power parity
of foreign consumption baskets relative to the DEM or EUR. All de°ated local-
currency ¯gures are converted back to DEM or EUR using this purchasing-power
proxy.
We use the foreign countries' CPIs (Consumer Price Indices from the IMF's
International Financial Statistics) to de°ate the ¯gures. Whenever a country's CPI
is not available from IFS but the main currency used in that country is issued in some
other country, we use the CPI of the currency-issuing country. The CPI de°ation
factors for all countries are rebased to unity at year-end 1998. For the ubs wage
data, we ¯rst translate U.S. dollars into Euros and then proceeded as detailed above.
Parent-level and sector-level domestic variables are transformed into December 1998
Euros using the German CPI.
D Wages
We base our estimation on sectoral manufacturing wages by country between 1996
and 2001 from the unido Industrial Statistics Database at the 3-digit ISIC level,
Rev. 2 (UNIDO 2005). The unido measure of annual sectoral wage bills includes all
payments to workers at establishments in the reference sector and year (wages and
salaries, remuneration for time not worked, bonuses and gratuities, allowances, and
payments in kind; but excludes contributions to social security, pensions, insurance,
severance and termination pay). We divide the sectoral wage bill by the sectoral
number of workers and employees. We de°ate the wages with the country-level CPI
(standardized to unity in December 1998) and convert the foreign currency to EUR
at the December 1998 exchange rate. To mitigate possible workforce composition
e®ects in our labor demand regression on wages, we use the sector median wage by
country (and lose sectoral wage variation also for Germany) in the outcome esti-
mation. We use sectoral unido wages for Germany in selection estimation because
workforce composition behind labor cost measures is not an econometric concern
for location choice. The unido data cover 109 countries and result in the largest
overlap with midi observations on German MNEs for estimation.
For robustness checks, we use oww monthly average wage rates of male workers
at the country level for 161 occupations in 155 countries between 1983 and 1999.
Missing observations, however, reduce the overlap with midi data on German MNEs
44below the overlap that unido data provide. We follow Freeman and Oostendorp's
(2001) recommendation and pick the base calibration with lexicographic weighting
for the aggregate wages by country. We de°ate the wages with the country-level
CPI (standardized to unity in December 1998) and convert the foreign currency
to EUR at the December 1998 exchange rate. We ¯ll missing values, by country
and occupation group, with information from the latest preceding year that has
wage information available and reuse oww wages from 1999 in 2000 and 2001. To
mitigate workforce composition e®ects, we take country medians over 161 oww
occupation groups for foreign wages. We multiply the resulting monthly median
occupation wage by twelve to approximate annual earnings for cost function esti-
mation. Complementing foreign oww wages, we use the German annual earnings
survey (table 62321 from destatis.de/genesis) and obtain sectoral monthly wages,
broken down into three blue-collar and four white-collar occupation groups by sec-
tor (two-digit NACE 1.1). We compute median wages over these seven occupation
groups by sector, de°ate them with the German CPI (standardized to unity in De-
cember 1998), and multiply them by twelve to arrive at annual earnings for cost
function estimation. Occupational wage information from the German annual earn-
ings survey enters the ILO database, on which oww wages are based, so that these
foreign and domestic wages are compatible.
For additional robustness checks, we also use ubs wage data collected by the
Swiss commercial bank for metropolitan areas around the world in 1994, 1997, 2000
and 2003 (UBS 2003). We linearly interpolate ubs wages between survey years
to cover our sample period 1996-2001. ubs carried out surveys in approximately
70 cities during the second quarter of 1994, 1997 and 2000, and during the ¯rst
quarter of 2003. Questionnaires request detailed information on wage components,
wage deductions and working hours across thirteen occupations. ubs converts wage
¯gures into U.S. dollars and smoothes the e®ect of day-to-day currency °uctuations
by using the average daily spot rate during the quarter of the ubs survey. We
convert ubs wages into EUR at the average USD/EUR exchange rate during the
survey quarter and de°ate ¯gures with the German CPI (standardized to unity in
December 1998). We use the machinist wage as the most closely comparable wage
to median oww and German wages. We take ubs wages also for Germany (and lose
sectoral variation).
Whenever foreign price de°ators are missing or period-average exchange rate
information is incomplete for purchasing-power parity oriented wage conversion, we
use current exchange rates and the German price de°ator.
E Market access
We construct market access measures following Redding and Venables (2004). We
obtain bilateral trade data for 1996 through 2001 and geographic information on
45Table 15: Location Definitions
Locations Countries
WEU Western European countries
(EU 15 plus Norway and Switzerland)
OIN Overseas Industrialized countries
including Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, USA
as well as Iceland and Greenland
CEE Central and Eastern European countries
including accession countries and candidates for EU
membership
DEV Developing countries
including Turkey, Russia and Central Asian economies
as well as dominions of Western European countries and
the USA
country pairs from cepii (www.cepii.fr). After ¯lling in missing imports to B from
A with exports information from country A to B, we drop all exports information
and set exports from A to B equal to B's imports from A. We adopt this proce-
dure because we consider imports, whenever available, more reliably measured than
exports.
Our regression speci¯cation for an unbalanced panel of country pairs by year is
lnXij = ®ixi + ¯jmj + ± lndij + ¹bij + ²ij;
where Xij denotes country i's aggregate exports in USD (+1) to country j, xi an
exporter country dummy, mj an importer country dummy, dij the geographical
distance between country i and j, and bij a dummy variable indicating a common
border. We compute market access Ai to country i as








j6=i expf¯j mjg(dij)± expf¹bijg:
This is measure MA(3) in Redding and Venables (2004).
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